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Presidential Address

Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era

Saul B. Cohen

Abstract. Evolution of the world geopolitical system follows organismic developmental principles. The system is complex. It is characterized by a flexibly hierarchical, specialized and integrated spatial structure. Global imbalance is a function of changes among and between geostrategic realms and their geopolitical regions. The imbalance especially reflects differences in entropic levels of major national states, particularly first- and second-order powers. As power becomes more diffused across the evolving world system, the system is better equipped to cope with the shock of change. The evolution of the system depends upon such change.

An evolving system is reflected in the multiplication of its parts. The system becomes more integrated as these parts become more specialized. A novel example of specialization is the Gateway region. Eastern Europe is emerging as the Gateway that will link the Maritime and Continental Geostrategic realms. Ultimately the Middle Eastern Shatterbelt may also acquire Gateway status. In addition, in the coming decades, nearly thirty Gateway states are likely to emerge. These are small exchange states with qualified sovereignty that will spin off from existing national entities to help link the world system. Such gateways serve the dynamic system as structures of accommodation.

American foreign policy needs to adapt to current geopolitical realities. The global system is increasingly becoming a seamless web whose salient characteristic is dynamic equilibrium, not rigidly imposed order. United States leadership cannot impose a PAX AMERICANA on the global system. It can, however, further its development through a carefully constructed series of policy moves that will strengthen global interdependence through partnerships of interest.

Key Words: asymmetrical state, change, developmental theory, entropy, equilibrium, flexible hierarchy, Gateway region, gateway state, general organismic system, geopolitical region, geostrategic realm, orders of power, polyocracy, power seesaw, Quarter-Sphere of Marginality, Shatterbelt, world order.

THE world is in the throes of international upheaval and the search is on for new structures to restore global stability. Many believe that just as the global balance has been upset by two cataclysmic episodes—the disintegration of East European and Soviet Communism, the dismantling of the Soviet centralized state, and the end of the Cold War—so can equilibrium be restored only by some sudden and equally dramatic international event. In fact, however, the rapid change in Soviet-American relations has not occurred because of these recent events alone. Rather, the changes are historic milestones in a continuing process that has marked the evolution of our geopolitical world over the past quarter-century.

Assuming that equilibrium—a condition of equal balance between arrays of opposing forces operating at different geographical scales—is the desired state, then its restoration will take more than one or even a series of diplomatic strokes, no matter how defining they are taken to be. For what is now being widely heralded as a sea-change in world history has not occurred because reasonable or desperate national leaders suddenly decided to behave differently (Rizopoulos 1990). Rather, it happened because of a sequence of events that have

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robbed both superpowers of the ability and need to continue the conflict. Challenged early on by the emergence of other major power centers, they then became bogged down in unsuccessful regional wars, each with dire domestic consequences. Even more compelling, glasnost and perestroika could not ward off the collapse of the Soviet economy, and Reaganomics hastened the end of America's hegemony over the world economy.

It is not surprising that international military and political earthquakes give rise to hopes and dreams of new world order. After such unexpected events, statespersons and politicians eagerly embrace the goal of reordering, and scholars busy themselves with explanatory theories. In ancient times these theories were often derived from religion and the supernatural. The modern approach seeks rational and scientific explanation. While historians, philosophers and social scientists are widely recognized for their contributions to international order theory, this is not the case for geographers. Geography made a prominent impact upon international policy in the past, but modern geographical concepts have been largely ignored by international-relations theorists.

In the U.S., older geopolitical ideas were embraced by Kennan, Acheson, Nitze, Dulles, Eisenhower, Rostow, Taylor, Kissinger, Nixon, Brzezinski and Haig (Brown 1989), and integrated into American foreign policy. Outdated versions of the Heartland-Rimland theory remained a tool for containment strategy long after that strategy had proved wanting. The American geopoliticians grasped spatially obsolete views because of their limited understanding of geography. For theirs was and is a definition of the discipline that is static, deterministic, and naive.

One example is Brzezinski's (1986) rigid embrace of Heartland containment. This led him to project geopolitics as a superpower contest for "lynchpin" states—Germany, Poland, South Korea, the Philippines and either the combination of Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Iran. His argument is that Soviet domination of South Korea and the Philippines would encircle China, and its command of Iran, or both Afghanistan and Pakistan, would enable it to project its power on the Indian Ocean. Such a view is dismissive of the innate geopolitical positions and strengths of China and India, and surely underestimates the costs of superpower alliances with weak and unstable regimes. In the same genre of geopolitical determinism was Jean Kirkpatrick's 1986 pronouncement that "Central America is the most important place in the world for the United States today" (quoted in O'Loughlin 1989, 321).

Current talk about a "New World Order" implies the possibility of an international situation that would remain stable. This is not a possibility. Change is not only inevitable but a necessary concomitant to progress. The challenge is to manage the change, channeling it in directions that promote equilibrium within the dynamic global system that reflects the interaction between political forces and human and physical environments.

Geographers today have an unparalleled opportunity to dispel geopolitical illiteracy by focusing on the geo of geopolitics. It is not easy to convey to policymakers and the public the complexity of the spatial structures and relationships that knit together the world system. But if we do not address these complexities in the public arena, and in ways that are spatially theoretically grounded, we will be remiss in carrying out our scholarly and civic responsibilities.

The geopolitical theory in this paper applies a spatial approach to the development of systems. The developmental perspective that is utilized is dynamic. While the geo accounts for the spatial dimension, the *politics* in geopolitics is the exercise of power that derives from and seeks to control economic, social and cultural forces. Reference to geopolitics then subsumes geoeconomics, a term that is gaining in currency, but should be no more separated from politics than should politics be separated from economic or social forces.

The geo in geopolitical analysis starts with spatial structure. To understand geopolitical systems, we must address the spatial categories that geographers use as frameworks of analysis. The structure is hierarchical. At the highest level are two geostrategic realms: the Maritime and the Eurasian Continental. Below the realm is the geopolitical region (Cohen 1973). Realms are arenas of strategic place and movement. Their trade orientations differ, the Maritime being open to specialized exchange, while the Continental is inner-oriented. Regions are shaped by contiguity and political, cultural, military and economic interaction. They are also influenced by historical movement (Fig. 1).




Figure 1. The world strategic realms and geopolitical regions in the 1990s, showing the hierarchical structure of the world's geopolitical framework. At the highest level are two geostrategic realms: the Maritime, an open system based upon exchange, and the Eurasian Continental, a much more closed and land-oriented system. South Asia is geopolitically independent, the Middle East Shatterbelt is caught between the two realms, while the East European Gateway is beginning to link them. Subsahara Africa and South America, the Quarter-Sphere of Marginality, are of little military and economic strategic concern to the Great Powers.

The Maritime realm has a global reach. Within it are geopolitical regions that constitute the second-level geopolitical of the hierarchy, including: Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, Offshore Asia, South America, and Subsahara Africa. The Eurasian Continental realm consists of two geopolitical regions: the Soviet Heartland and East Asia.

Most of the second-level regions are contained within the realms. Three, however, lie outside. South Asia is an independent region. The Middle East is a Shatterbelt, a zone of contention caught between the two realms. The third is the emerging Gateway region of Central and Eastern Europe. This is a transitional zone that can facilitate contact and interchange between the two realms.

The third level of the hierarchy is the national state. States are hierarchically-ordered, according to their power positions and functions in the world system. Gateway territories are a special category. Currently they are components of the subnational, or fourth level, of the hierarchy. Gateways are embryonic states which can accelerate exchanges that will stimulate the evolution of larger nations from which the gateways have spun off.

The world system is in a continuing process of development, becoming a seamless web as it moves towards greater specialization and integration. As national energies and transnational forces gain or lose momentum, the regional frameworks—realms, regions, states, and subnational units—change in status and in boundaries. This, in effect, produces new parts-to-whole relationships within the system which require rebalancing.

Immediately after the Second World War, equilibrium was struck through the division of the world into two geostrategic realms, each controlled by a superpower. A new balance was then fashioned as geopolitical regions became important subsets of the world system. This was due to the rise of additional great power centers and the emergence of important regionally-based states. The map has continued to change as some Shatterbelts have appeared and disappeared.

In the near future, we anticipate the new emerging geopolitical phenomena—the Gateway region and Gateway states—will play significant roles in restoring balance to the world system. They will complement the efforts of transnational forces that are now knitting the world together economically and socially. These integrative forces can more than offset the centrifugal forces of nationalistic Balkanization that once again are seeking to put their stamp on the world map.

Finally, the geopolitical insights derived from this analysis will be applied to a series of foreign policy recommendations for the U.S. It is time for Americans to sweep away the last vestiges of outmoded, unidimensional spatial thinking. In particular, because ours is a polycratic and polycentric world, to continue to focus essentially on the Eurasian center is as geographically misleading as to shift to the concept of a unified Pacific Rim (Ginsburg 1988).

Holdover thinking from the Nixon-era geopolitics that believed the Sino-Soviet schism to be necessary to thwart Eurasian unity is counterproductive to global peace. So are growing pressures in the U.S. to push German and Japanese remilitarization in order to share the burden of policing the world. Soviet and Chinese fears of such remilitarization are well-grounded. World balance will be more easily regained if the U.S. and a reconstituted Soviet Union maintain their military primacy, while the superpowers and other parts of the world become increasingly interdependent with the economies of Maritime Europe and Offshore Asia.

In South Asia, the U.S. should recognize India's legitimate desires to be neutral in the superpower rivalry, as well as the reality of India's dominant position on the subcontinent. The American military alliance with Pakistan that brought India and the Soviet Union more closely together was based upon the flawed logic of a China-Pakistan-U.S. counterbalance to Soviet ambitions in Eurasia. Our choice of Pakistan as a partner has been as geopolitically unsound as was our espousal of Somalia as a counter to Ethiopia.

In the Middle East, Europe's interests as an intrusive power are as legitimate as those of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Even if the superpowers exercise their military pressures in concert, they will not be able to bring contending regional powers to the peace table. America should recognize that the European Community has a great deal to offer the Middle East economically and politically, and needs to treat the Community as an equal partner in the efforts to promote regional peace and security.

Finally, North-South relations cannot be ignored in the face of the overwhelming temptation to focus on East-West ties. The "Quarter-Sphere of Marginality" (Subsahara Africa and South America) will destabilize the world through local and regional conflicts, unless greater economic and political attention is accorded the region. It is especially imperative that the U.S. redirect its foreign aid to these needy lands, rather than continue to concentrate nearly all of its economic and military aid on a handful of military allies.

Moreover, regional balance is not an alternative to past efforts to strike a global equilibrium through a standoff among the major powers. Pan-regions are neither economically adequate nor politically feasible. The world is now far too interdependent. Global equilibrium requires an open system, not a precarious balance based exclusively upon megaregions.

Past Geographic Thinking on World Order

In the early part of this century, geographers made important theoretical contributions to the attempts to fashion new world orders for their times. Most noteworthy was Sir Halford Mackinder. In his warning to peacemakers in 1919, Mackinder described the world as a closed system. Nothing could be altered without altering the balancing of everything, and rule of the world still rested upon force, notwithstanding the juridical assumptions of equality among sovereign states. Mackinder called himself a democratic idealist in advocating equality of opportunity for nations to achieve balanced economic development. He also described himself as a realist who feared that the League of Nations would degenerate into an unbalanced empire, as one or two of the great powers bid for predominance. As a safeguard, he urged smaller powers to federate among themselves to increase the number of significant players on the world scene and make it more difficult for hegemony to be attained by potential tyrants (Mackinder 1919).

Mackinder remained steadfast in his commitment to the concept of balance. In looking at the shape of the post-World War II order, he saw an eventual balance between a combination of the Heartland and Midland Ocean powers that could keep Germany in check, and the Monsoon lands of India and China (Mackinder 1943). He also speculated that the continental masses bordering the South Atlantic might eventually become part of the balancing process. The Mantle of Vacancies from the Sahara through the Central Asia deserts that divide the major communities of humankind was another component of the balanced system. Mackinder forecast that this barrier region might someday provide solar energy as a substitute for exhaustible resources.

Another geographer also engaged at policy levels in attempts to fashion a new world order, the one envisaged by Woodrow Wilson, was Isaiah Bowman. "The effects of the Great War are so far-reaching that we shall have henceforth a new world . . . the new era would date from the years of the First World War just as Medieval Europe dates from the fall of Rome, or the modern democratic era dates from the Declaration of Independence" (Bowman 1922, 1, 2). Describing the war as the combination of assassination, invasion and Germanic ambitions, "colored by the desire to control the seats of production and the channels of transportation of all those products" (1922, 8) he viewed the relations among states as an evolutionary struggle.

Bowman did not believe that the League of Nations was, in and of itself, the framework for a New World. Rather, he saw different leagues emerging for functional purposes, each designed to advance cooperative plans that would reduce the causes of international trouble. "The world's people are still fundamentally unlike, and the road to success passes through a wilderness of experiment" (1922, 11). No grand theory, here, as was Mackinder's, but rather the prescription of an empiricist, of a practitioner with his nose to boundaries, resources, national minorities—a world of shifting international parts that were disorganized, unstable and dangerous and required mediating international groups to minimize the dangers. Bowman's ideas for a new world were essentially a map of the world as it was, with greater attention to the sovereign needs of certain nationalities and a need for coordinated international action. His work was, in effect, an explication of what problems would be encountered by Woodrow Wilson's fourteenth point—the call for a general association of nations to guarantee the peace of the world.

The most direct, and infamous, geographical

contributor to the concept of new world order was, of course, Karl von Haushofer, whose doctrine of Geopolitik became an intellectual underpinning for Nazi world conquest (Whittlesey 1942). Balance-of-power theories drawn from Arnold Guyot (1889) were the basis for Haushofer's Pan-Regions, and, potentially, for a harmonious world community. On the other hand, Haushofer's espousal of Mackinder's Heartland theory was seized upon by the Nazis as the spatial key to German world conquest and the framework for a new world order dominated from the Eurasian power center.

The concept of regionality was central to the writings of these three geographical scholars. However, differing levels of regional organization and hierarchy were absent from their thinking. Today's complex political and spatial world requires more intricate analysis.

The World State

In contrast, in a tradition that went back to Immanuel Kant, there was a body of scholarship that held that the physical unity of the globe required a single, unified political world system. His writings on physical geography reflected his philosophical outlook (May 1970). Kant's "Universal International State" was based on the proposition that nature had drawn people by wars to the most desirable parts of the world, and that a unified political mechanism was necessary to enforce the peace on them (Kant 1795).

The English historian H.G. Wells, whose *Outline of History* first appeared in 1920, discounted the League as not being a league of peoples, but of states, dominions, and colonies. For him, the new world promised by the League of Nations was the old world once again. A new world order meant a world state—"Our true nationalism is mankind"—with a common religion, common education, no military and production for general use with private enterprise controlled to serve humankind (Wells 1920). For Wells, the capitalist system which drove the state was not a system at all—only unplanned production for private profit.

Wells's dreams of a world state came to naught, as did pre- and post-World War II prescriptions for world federalism. In 1938, Clarence Streit called for a Federal Union of North Atlantic Democracies, with their South Asian and African colonial dependencies as potentially free members. His notion was that this union would constitute an unbalancing power, with so much preponderance that troublemakers could not upset it (Streit 1938). Instead, the world that emerged after World War II was bipolar, the hegemonic struggle between the superpowers submerging the United Nations that had been established as successor to the League. This happened notwithstanding that the new world organization now included the U.S. and had a two-tier system that embraced a Security Council with five permanent members and the mandate to enforce the peace that the Geneva body had lacked.

Equilibrium and Change

Now, in this last decade of the twentieth century, we hear the siren call for a New World Order once again. The collapse of Communism, the end of the Cold War, the allied victory in the Persian Gulf, and the dismantling of the centralized Soviet state have inspired the hopes that a new order is dawning and fired the debate anew about the form that the new international arrangements should take. The rhetoric of the aims is not novel: peace and security, reduction of military weapons, sharing the wealth, justice for national groups. The mechanism is what is at question. Can there be a truly global system in which the world acts in concert through the United Nations? Is it now feasible to save the world through a PAX AMERICANA? Or can we count upon the world's major power centers—the U.S., the European Community, Japan, the emerging reconstituted and loosely federated U.S.S.R., and China to take collective action to stabilize and enhance a New World Order?

Cynics scoff at the notion that the concept of a New World is anything but the Old World cloaked in new rhetoric. They maintain that power, not universal law, will govern whatever system emerges and that therefore the prospects for substantive change are slim (Lapham 1991). There are grounds for such concern, but there is also a reason for hope. Arms control talks between the superpowers are progressing. So are discussions for reducing the flow of arms to the Middle East. The Warsaw Pact is history, NATO is redefining its structure and mission, and the West is seeking ways of enabling Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to rebuild themselves economically and political-

ly. Moreover, regional wars in Angola, Ethiopia and Namibia are over, and the shooting has given way to diplomacy in Cambodia and Afghanistan.

Despite its sweeping military victory, America's political and economic dependence upon the support of other nations to wage the Gulf War has demonstrated its basic inability to impose a PAX AMERICANA on most parts of the world. The conflict was not a unilateral action. While the U.S. took the lead militarily, it had to hold its breath politically lest the alliance fall apart, and to "beg" for financial support from outside states. In fact, the five major powers need one another in ways that have no historic precedents in modern great power relations. And the United Nations Security Council, while it may not have a clear collective interest, nevertheless proved its importance by serving as a forum that required a consensus among its permanent members. This is a consensus that will be as important in stabilizing the global system as it was for waging war.

How we treat the end of the Cold War and a New World Order is very much a matter of conceptualization and perspective. We probably should not even be discussing the topic of order, because global stability is a function of equilibrial processes, not order. Order is static. It speaks to a fixed arrangement, a formal disposition or array by ranks and clusters that requires strong regulation and implies a sharply defined set of niches separated by clear-cut boundaries. The niches fit together in an elaborate structure which follows a blueprint designed by some body that operates either hegemonically or consensually. Essentially, order implies outside regulation. As Tennyson put it, "everything is in its proper place or function."

Equilibrium, on the other hand, is dynamic. We are not using equilibrium in the physical or psychophysical sense that the natural state of the organism is rest or homeostasis. Such equilibrium characterizes closed systems but does not fit human organizations. Surely a geopolitical system whose parts would be so arranged that their resultant force at every point is zero, is both theoretically and practically impossible. Instead, by equilibrium, we refer to the quality of balance between opposing influences and forces in an open system. Balance is regained after disturbance by the introduction of new weights or stimuli.

The process that enables the system to progress developmentally is dynamic equilibrium. The balance is not only maintained by what Adam Smith referred to as an "Invisible Hand," or the rational self-interest of peoples. For in the absence of reason, excesses of war, economic greed and environmental imbalances ultimately encounter resistance. When things go too far, there is reaction, correction, regulation. Humankind does fear a world of disorder or Manicheanism. The "rage for order" that Schutz recognized in the human mind and carried over to the social world, "The World is always given to me from the first as an organized one" (Schutz 1964), shapes the course of international politics.

When new weights are introduced, they alter the content and boundaries of the system's parts. The lines separating the parts have ragged edges and are permeable, within hierarchical levels and between them. Sometimes the parts overlap, creating border zones rather than lines.

As systems mature, their parts multiply and draw power away from the center. In a decentralizing system, where the individual territorial units have increasing responsibility for marshaling their energies, the interaction among the components becomes self-directing. This interaction may be competitive, or it may be cooperative, but it is almost always turbulent. For, without turbulence there is no change, and without change there is no progress. G.B. Shaw said "progress is impossible without change," and Carl Jung added "in all chaos there is a cosmos, in all disorder a secret order."

The argument as to whether our world is in order or disorder should, then, be revolving around the question of whether or not it is presently in a stage of short-term disequilibrium that is intrinsic to the process of dynamic equilibrium, or in complete systemic collapse. To answer this question, we need to look to the sequence of events and their trends, to gain insights into the direction of the equilibrial process. No single event, no matter how cataclysmic, is likely in and of itself to be the defining event. Some of the sequencing, inevitably, involves a dialectic in which opposites play against one another in maintaining a dynamic balance through change.

A major manifestation of such change is the reorientation and realignment of political territorial units. Regrouping occurs at all levels of the geopolitical scale—from realm, to region, to state to national subdivisions. Such regrouping is not spatially random or independent of

lines provided by nature. Instead, the world can be likened to a diamond, not a pane of glass. Its geopolitical cleavages occur along specific fault lines which are drawn from an array of optional boundaries provided by nature (Cohen 1973). The relative strength of particular cores determines where and at what hierarchical scales geopolitical repartitioning takes place.

Boundary shifts are part of the change process. An example is the western boundary of the Continental Realm. The U.S.S.R.'s relationship to its western periphery has weakened dramatically. Central and Eastern Europe have split away from the realm, probably to become a separate Gateway region. Thus, the Heartland boundary that had been pushed westward to the Elbe in 1945, approximating the ancient boundary between Slavs and Germans as recognized by the 843 Treaty of Verdun, has shifted eastward once again. The line now extends from the eastern end of the Baltic to the northwestern Black Sea. It follows the eastern edge of the Masurian lakes, the western end of Polesia, the Bug River and the Carpathians. Essentially, the new boundary follows the widening of the North European Plain.

It is noteworthy that the realm's boundary has not been pushed back to the western borders of Mackinder's 1904 Pivotland, the area of Eurasian Continental and Arctic drainage bounded by the Volga and White and Caspian Seas (Mackinder 1904). The Soviet Union has, however, lost political and economic, if not military strategic hegemony over the western halves of the Baltic and Black Sea Basins and the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, which in 1919 Mackinder had included in the Heartland for purposes of strategic thinking (Mackinder 1919).

Shifts in the boundaries of geopolitical regions may also take place. Offshore Asia has extended its reaches to include Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, and closer links between Venezuela and Colombia could push the Anglo-American and Caribbean geopolitical region's boundaries southward to include Colombia. This is because Venezuelan-Colombian interaction, historically focused along Colombia's Caribbean coast and particularly in the Gulf of Venezuela, is now also taking on an Andean economic orientation. Moreover, Colombia's impact upon the U.S. through its drug trade has linked it more closely to Anglo-America, albeit for so negative a purpose.

Another example of change, disturbance, reaction, and steps towards restoration of equilibrium can be found in Lebanon. The Palestine Liberation Organization's establishment of a state-within-a-state in the South and its escalation of guerrilla activities triggered Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israeli troops quickly rolled north to Beirut, overrunning the PLO territory and breaching the "Red Line" that had hitherto been respected by Israel and Syria as being necessary to maintain the balance between them. Subsequent political events forced Israel to withdraw to its present Security Zone along the Lebanese border. The "Red Line" once again became a reality that contributes to the uneasy equilibrium. However, the position of the Palestinians is now substantially weakened. They cannot create a new state-within-a-state as both the new Lebanese government and the Syrians are committed to supporting the Lebanese army in disarming the PLO militias lest Israel once again be provoked, as well as in disbanding the various Lebanese militias.

In July, 1991, the Lebanese army successfully removed the PLO from their bases in the South and forced them to surrender their heavy weapons. If PLO activities against Israel are halted by this action, Israel will face enormous political pressure to withdraw from its South Lebanon Security Zone and to accept the disarming of the South Lebanon Army—the militia which it has so carefully built up and supported. Thus, the recent agreement between Lebanon and Syria whereby Lebanon has become a de facto Syrian protectorate is likely to stabilize the situation in a variety of ways. The Syrians are, in effect, now responsible for containing PLO terrorism. By splitting their forces between Lebanon and the Golan Heights, they have become more vulnerable to Israeli attack and therefore are more committed to maintaining a new balance.

Evolution of the System

Since short-term imbalance is intrinsic to dynamic equilibrium, the overriding question about the nature of the present turbulence is whether it seems to be leading to a more integrated world system. For the relations be-

tween Eastern and Western Europe, or between the industrialized powers of the Maritime world and the various republics of the Soviet Union, the trend is clearly towards integration. At the regional level, this also seems to be taking place in the Middle East. The Gulf War was surely a major disturbance. Its result, however, seems likely to promote greater integration between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and Syria. In general, we can hypothesize that recent changes in the world are trending from spatial differentiation to specialized integration.

For the serious student of geopolitical analysis, then, such a question as recently posed by a political scientist—"are the great tectonic plates of geopolitics and economics upon which a post-World War II American foreign policy has been based shifting?" misses the point (Hamilton 1989). This shift is ongoing, not new. As in earth processes, geopolitical plates are constantly moving. There are larger and smaller tremors, but the signs of change have been there for all who cared to see—and they did not start with the end of the Cold War.

Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Comintern in 1948 because of Tito's heresies, Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, the Treaty of Rome in 1957 creating the European Economic Community, the Sino-Soviet break of 1960–61, the attempt at democratization of Czechoslovakia which prompted the Soviet invasion of 1968, the OPEC oil price rise after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, U.S. loss of the Vietnam War in 1973, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988, the tearing down of the Berlin wall and the unification of Germany in 1989 and 1990, the collapse of East European Communism, America's changed status from a creditor to debtor nation, the deterioration of the U.S.S.R., the end of the Cold War, and America's lead role in defeating Iraq—these are all part of the process of geopolitical change. Ahead and part of the continuing change process lie the Europe of 1992, the possible fragmentation of the Union of Soviet (Sovereign) Republics, and any number of other energizing events to come—the expected and the unexpected.

Moreover, change is not limited to the relationship between the North Atlantic and European Heartland centers. The emergence of regional powers in the 1970s and dedevelopment in much of the Third World in the 1980s have contributed to global geopolitical shifts. In Anglo-America and the Caribbean, U.S. ties to Central America are being redefined by the defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the overthrow of Noriega in Panama. These events represent, ironically for some, not an enhancement of American power in Central America, but rather a triumph for indigenous and regional forces, as evidenced by the continuing turmoil in El Salvador. The defeat of Marxist totalitarianism in Ethiopia alerts us to impending regional changes in the Horn of Africa. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Zone, which is likely to be extended to Mexico, and the tortuous diplomatic attempts by the U.S. and Japan to find a new basis for trade relations are still additional signs of significant change. So are the government of South Africa's legitimation of the ANC (African National Congress) and its commitment to constitutional reform based upon universal voting rights the first step in a White/Black accommodation there, and increasing pressures to bring Israel and the Palestinian Arabs and Arab confrontation states to the negotiations table.

What we are witnessing is the evolution of the global system. The military equilibrium struck by superpower detente had, over a period of four decades, been superseded by an overarching set of equilibrial forces that included multinational corporate networks, global capital flows, the specialization of industry, technological transfer and adaptation, and the rejection of Moscow's brand of Communism and one-party rule. While these forces are viewed as global, in fact they also often have regional clusterings. This regional impact contributes to the salience of the geopolitical region, as second-order powers interact with other countries in their regional arenas. Smaller states that have become specialized centers of economic and political activity within the global network may also have a shadow effect on the regions within which they are located.

In the face of all these developments, it is instructive that there has been no cataclysmic collapse and global conflagration, as posited in theories of change based upon cyclical and deterministic economic interpretations of history (Wallerstein 1983; Modelski 1987). Wallerstein's economic dialectics and Modelski's long-cycle model based upon a hegemonic explanation of

world political economic forces (O'Loughlin 1989) do not match current realities. New major and regional powers have challenged and changed the bipolar world, but they haven't displaced the superpowers. Rather, they have become absorbed within an evolving system. Communism and single-party rule are disappearing, and with considerable disturbance to the system. But their demise has been attended by "whimpers" rather than the "big bang."

In arguing that the hegemonic decline of American economic and therefore military power is part of the 500-year cycle of hegemonic "overstretch," Kennedy (1987) promotes the concept that economic decline and overextension of military commitments ultimately bring the downfall of all Great Powers. The thesis is that the colonial record of uneven economic growth and technological change has led to military decline in an essentially anarchical world system. While, in the epilogue of his volume, Kennedy does suggest that the decline of hegemonic power need not always lead to war, he nevertheless bases his thinking upon a system that has reflected a very different kind of world—a world of dependency, not interdependency. Today's world system is fundamentally different from that of the past. For in our world, the relationship between political/military and economic power is not one-to-one; economic hierarchy is not necessarily translated into political hierarchy. We have learned from the experience of economically resurgent Japan and West Germany that the exercise of parallel political/military power is neither necessary nor desirable for a nation to enjoy economic and social prosperity. Trading states (Rosecrance 1986) are particularly cautious about diverting their energies from the quest for economic growth, and military power is no longer necessary to safeguard access to resources. Continued capital flows and technological innovation do so.

In addition, resources are increasingly substitutable, and a modern service and high-technology-oriented economy relies increasingly on sophisticated manpower, not raw labor. Also, international agencies are taking on functions that major powers no longer wish to assume through independent action, and the gap in international political inequality between large and small states is narrowing in behavioral as well as juridical ways.

Finally, hegemonic structure is becoming increasingly complex, as the concept of hierarchy of cultures is widely challenged. Old notions of Eurocentric cultural primacy are fading. The success of sophisticated Offshore Asian economies undermines the myth of Western cultural supremacy. Also, as richness of culture, religion, and historic traditions are not nearly as subject to the test of economic development as they once were, the world exhibits a greater spirit of equality.

While forms of political colonialism (Western, Russian, Chinese and Third World) persist, and while international financial and economic agencies and bodies have not fully eliminated classic national economic colonialism, the erosion of cultural colonialism has been a significant equalizer in the relations among states and peoples. It has substantially muted, reduced or altered the role of hierarchy in the structure of the international system.

While the web of hierarchy still retains relevance in an integrated system, the web is so flexible, so dense and provides so many optional contacts, that models of dominance/subordinance and rigid hierarchy no longer reflect the process of integration within a world that is evolving according to general systems principles.

Geopolitical Systems as General Organismic Systems

Treating the world as a general organismic system provides insight into the relationships between political structures and their operational environments. These interactions produce the geopolitical forces which shape the system, upset it and then lead it towards new levels of equilibrium. To understand the system's evolution, it is useful to apply a developmental approach. Such an approach is derived from theories advanced in sociology, biology and psychology. The developmental principle holds that systems evolve in predictably structured ways, that they are open to outside forces and that hierarchy, regulation and entropy are important characteristics.

Herbert Spencer was among the first to set forth a development hypothesis that drew an analogy between the physical organism and social organization (1860). His evolutionary ideas came from physiology and the proposition that organisms change from homogeneity to het-

erogeneity. Using the organic growth analogy, Spencer argued that social organizations evolve from a state of indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to one of relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity (1969, 21). For Spencer, state and land meant the combination of social organization and physical organisms.

Spencer not only recognized the mutual dependence of parts, including the social role of the division of labor. He wrote of the duality of society, with two controlling organizations—the outer one with a centralized control or governance system for defense and the prevention of anarchy, the inner one with a decentralized regulatory control for industry. He likened these two levels, sometimes cooperating, sometimes antagonistic to one another, to the organic world. That world is differentiated between the outer part—the outer wall that is in direct contact with the environment—and the inner part—the digestive sac that is not. Each organ has its own controlling system, to promote either cooperation or antagonism between the two (1969, 277). Spencer's concept has particular pertinence to our understanding of the processes by which the Soviet Union may be reconstituted.

Combining organismic concepts from Herbert Spencer, the sociologist, with those of Heinz Werner (1948), the psychologist, and Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1966), the psycho-biologist, provides the foundations for a spatially-structured geopolitical theory. It is a theory that is holistic, is concerned with order and process of interconnecting parts, and applies at all levels of the political territorial hierarchy, from the subnational to the national to the supranational.

To adapt the developmental principle geopolitically, we hypothesize a system that progresses spatially in stages. The earliest is undifferentiated. Here none of the territorial parts are interconnected, and their functions are identical. The next stage is differentiation, when parts have distinguishable characteristics, but are still isolated. The highest stage is specialization and hierarchical integration. Exchange of the specialized and complementary outputs of the different territorial parts leads to an integration of the system. The hierarchical structure directs the flow of these outputs.

World War II and the end of colonialism paved the way for new world geopolitical arrangements. It is thus a logical starting point for tracing the development of the current system. In the early postwar years the two bipolar realms controlled by the Soviet Union and the U.S. were clearly differentiated from each other. Within each realm, however, the parts were relatively undifferentiated. This was the period when nations had begun to recover from the ravages of the Second World War. There was also little hierarchy within either realm. Both Stalin and Dulles believed that superpowers could influence all parts of their respective geostrategic arenas, without the need for any intermediaries.

That system quickly changed. Within the Maritime World, specialized regional cores like Common Market Europe and Japan arose, initially as junior partners and then as friendly competitors to the U.S. Europe has been the first to emerge as a political and economic bloc. Within the Eurasian realm, China soon challenged the U.S.S.R. for strategic parity. These new power centers began to develop independent ties to other states and regions.

The challenge to superpower monopoly brought new forms of hierarchy into the relations between the superpowers and their peripheries. As Albania defected from Soviet suzerainty, it looked to China for protection. In the Caribbean, Cuba broke with the U.S. and turned to the U.S.S.R. Then the Soviet Union was able to extend its influence through Cuba to Jamaica, Guyana and especially Nicaragua.

Also, in the 1970s, a number of regionally-important states began to emerge. This gave added substance to the regional structure. These states imposed a hierarchy of their own within their respective regions. India became dominant in South Asia, defeating Pakistan in war and casting its stamp upon Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, as well as Nepal and Bhutan. Nigeria, not the U.S., has led the way to a resolution of the Liberian conflict, although the U.S. had been Liberia's traditional patron. Vietnam, with help from the Soviet Union, drove the Khmer Rouge from power and, for more than a decade, achieved dominance in Indochina. China, which to date has failed to impose it suzerainty over Vietnam, championed the Khmer Rouge, but could not prevent Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia.

While hierarchy remains a major structural element of the world system, it does not follow the rigid rank order in either power or distance terms as it does in the natural world. Rather,

the hierarchy is flexible. States can exert influence over others without always having to defer to those in the rank above them. Thus, Albania broke away from Tito's control to reach directly to the U.S.S.R. before splitting with the U.S.S.R. and turning to China. Mexico and Venezuela defied the U.S. to try to shape an independent Central American policy.

There is flexibility in hierarchy both because of the maturation of individual states, and because power relations are no longer a function of sheer distance. Air, sea and telecommunications allow ties to develop between states that are relatively far apart. Flexibility is further enhanced by the impact upon individual states of transnational corporations and international social and political organizations. These flows often circumvent the international "pecking order." New York financial services deal directly with Hong Kong, they need not go through Tokyo. Similarly, joint research activities are conducted between state agencies within the U.S. and those of the Russian Federated Republic, bypassing the federal research bodies of both countries.

This increasingly complex and open world system can be described as a "polyocracy." The system has overlapping spheres of influence, varying degrees of hegemony and hierarchy, national components and transnational influences, interdependencies and pockets of self-containment. It is all the more complex because its parts are at different stages of development. The Continental Realm is seeking to catch up with the Maritime by opening itself to market forces and, with the probably temporary exception of China, political pluralism. Geopolitical regions, too, vary in attributes depending on their particular settings. Regional states play differing roles according to their spatial and economic interactions with major powers and neighbors.

What helps to link the system is the drive of the less mature parts to rise to the level already achieved by the more mature sectors. The balance of relationships across and within the nested regional frameworks can be analyzed in terms of entropic, regulatory, and hierarchical conditions. This provides some guidelines to help determine levels of development.

Entropy and Orders of Power

A key element in the dynamism of the system lies in shifts in power among different states and regions. Some power changes are the result of domestic developments, either in political organization, economic structures or social patterns. Others can be attributed to external national and transnational forces. Three orders of national power, the first or major, the second or regional, and the third subregional, affect the balance of the global system, but even lesser-order states are change agents influencing regional and global patterns, witness Angola, Afghanistan and Ethiopia.

In ranking states and regions, standard national power measurements, e.g., land area, soil, water and mineral resources, transportation and communication networks, population numbers, educational quality, and military arsenals are useful. However, they do not paint the full picture, and can often be misleading, witness Argentina and Saudi Arabia. A nation's long-term strength is very much a function of its cohesiveness, its ideological vigor, its national will, its self-image, its goals and strategy for wielding international influence, and its capacity for renewal (Cohen 1982).

Entropy level is indicative of where a state or region fits in the various orders of power, and is also a useful measure of balance in relationships between geopolitical units. Defined, in physical systems, as the availability of energy to do work, entropy is always on the increase as energy becomes exhausted. Thus a system's ability to work constantly declines. If the world were to consist of closed geopolitical units, then surely each unit would ultimately collapse. We would then have to agree with Cloud (1988, 232): "Borrowed biological energy degrades to unusable forms ... the energy dies. Entropy gets us in the end."

Only hermetically-sealed systems, however, behave according to this law of inevitability. This is not the case for person-environment systems. Geopolitical entities whose leadership seeks to close them off from outside forces do suffer from the exhaustion of their human and natural resources and sink to high levels of entropy; ultimately, however, human needs and strivings pry open the system, for geopolitical entities are inherently open. They become recharged through a form of energy transport that introduces peoples, goods, and ideas as high free energy. In particularly favored open systems, there may be so much energy transport that the level is negative. Thus, while the Soviet Union or Albania have experienced dramatic increases in entropy levels as a result of




Figure 2. Geopolitical reach and balance. Global equilibrium is partly a function of the reach and balance of its geopolitical regions to one another. These regions have different levels of entropy and military capacity. Equilibrium is enhanced when regions with strong military but high-to-medium entropy levels (Heartland, East Asia) are matched against modest military but low-entropy regions (Maritime Europe, Offshore Asia). Equilibrium is upset when a strong military, rapidly increasing entropy-level region is matched against a strong military, low-entropy region (Anglo-America).

their decades-long attempt to close their systems, Singapore, in contrast, has negative entropy.

Criteria that can be used to measure entropy include: savings rates; agricultural yields; manufacturing productivity; debt repayment; percentage of R&D exports; numbers of patents, scientists and engineers, and foreign scientific exchange; and reduction of fuel-energy intensity requirements. In general, based upon the criteria that have been enumerated, regions fall into four categories: (1) low entropy: Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, Offshore Asia; (2) medium entropy: Heartland, Eastern Europe, Middle East; (3) high entropy: East Asia, South Asia; (4) very high entropy: Subsahara Africa, South America (Fig. 2).

In effect, a state or region's reach, or extent of influence beyond its borders, is a function of the combination of its level of entropy and its military-strategic strength. The reach can be measured by external trade, capital flow, diplomatic relations, immigration and transit links, and overseas military bases. Using these measures (*The Economist World Atlas and Almanac*

1989; Kidron and Segal 1987), the U.S. reaches out throughout its own region, and also quite strongly to five others: Maritime Europe, Offshore Asia, South America, Subsahara Africa, and the Middle East. On the other hand, a negative flow in capital accounts, chronic budget deficits and trade imbalance is indicative of an increase in entropic level. In terms of equilibrial relations, America is in balance with Europe and Offshore Asia and is in overbalance with South America, Subsahara Africa, and the Middle East.

The European Community dominates its region and has substantial geopolitical reach to Anglo-America, the Middle East, Subsahara Africa, South America, Offshore Asia, and Eastern Europe. Its entropic level is low, and it is fully capable of transporting surplus energy to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Europe is in balance with Anglo-America and Offshore Asia and in overbalance with its other regions of major contact.

Offshore Asia, spearheaded by Japan and its successfully industrializing neighbors, reaches to Anglo-America, the Middle East, Europe, South Asia, and East Asia. With its very low level of entropy, it is also in a position to project substantial reach to the Heartland. The region is in balance with Anglo-America and Europe, and overbalanced with the rest of its contact area.

The Heartland is at a medium entropic level which is rising rapidly in the light of its recent economic stagnation and the collapse of the centralized Soviet political system. Its reach is to East Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe, and it is in balance with all of these regions. China, dominant in East Asia, extends its reach to the Heartland, South Asia, and to Offshore Asia. It is in balance with the Heartland, but underbalanced with Offshore Asia.

Regional or second-order powers are cores for their regions. They have nodal characteristics in terms of trade and transportation, and military influence, and they aspire to regional or subregional hegemony. Limited extraregional economic or political ties are also characteristic of such powers. Finally, while often overshadowed by a great power, second-order states try to avoid satellite status, sometimes by playing off one major power against the other.

Third-order states influence regional events in special ways. They compete with neighboring regional powers on ideological and political grounds, or in having a specialized resource base, but they lack the population, military and general economic capacities of second-order rivals. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Taiwan, North Korea, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Hungary retain such status. Lesser order states like Sudan or Ecuador have impact only on their nearest neighbors, while fifth-order states like Nepal have only marginal external involvements.

Membership in the various orders is fluid. China is now only marginally a first-order power. Unless it matures through opening the system and finds genuine accommodation with a restructured and revitalized Soviet Union, it may slip to second-order status, on a level with India. A decade ago, twenty-seven nations could be measured as potential second-order powers (Cohen 1982). Of these, Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Zaire and now Cuba have fallen from the ranking or never really had attained it. The German Democratic Republic has disappeared from the map altogether. On the other hand, South Korea and Thailand have recently achieved regional power ranking. Third-order status is also ephemeral. Tunisia, Tanzania, Ghana, and Costa Rica have enjoyed and then lost such ranking with the waning of their ideological influence.

The combined inputs of major powers and second- and third-order states give regionalism geopolitical substance. A state which may be described as "asymmetrical" plays a special role in the regional personality. It promotes turbulence by challenging the norms of hegemonic regional structures and injecting unwelcomed energy into the system. Sometimes this produces dialectic response that brings change in those norms (Cohen 1984). Revolutionary Cuba, democratic Israel, Titoist Yugoslavia, the market-oriented Ivory Coast of the 1970s, radical Libya, and fundamentalist Iran are examples of asymmetrical states that have profound impact upon their respective regions. So were Sandinista Nicaragua and a Romania that insisted upon conducting a foreign policy independent of the Soviet Union, and so is isolationist Myanmar.

Ultimately some of the initiatives of the asymmetrical state are grudgingly adopted by its neighbors. Kuwait may soon play such a role within the Arab Gulf states, if forces there succeed in overthrowing the Emir or in converting the regime to a constitutional monarchy. Other future regional "mavericks" could be a revolutionary Philippines or Peru, an anti-European

Morocco, should the King be overthrown by fundamentalist forces, or a post-Mobuto Zaire that shakes off its ties to the West.

Geostrategic Realms and Regions

The geostrategic realm is the highest regional level of the global system. Despite the profound changes that have taken place in the world in recent years, the basic framework of two geostrategic realms remains—the Trade-Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian Continental World. Of the world's five major power centers, only one is now both a military and an economic colossus: the U.S. Two are great military forces, but relatively weak economically: the U.S.S.R. and China. Two are dominant economic forces without equally strong military capacities: Japan and the European Community. Because Japan and Maritime Europe lack vast strategic space and are vulnerable to the military pressures of their near Chinese or Soviet neighbors, the strategic alliance with the U.S. remains their strongest security card. However NATO may change, the American partnership with its trade-dependent, maritime realm allies is mutually needed.

The deteriorating economic and political fortunes of the Soviet Union may lead some to ask whether the concept of a Eurasian geostrategic realm still has validity. Those who have heralded the triumph of liberal democracy over Communism and the collapse of the unitary governmental structure are premature in dismissing the U.S.S.R. from its perch as a controlling state in an arena of the world that has impact upon much of the rest. A revived, albeit smaller and loosely confederated union that is ideologically compatible with its East European neighbors will remain in a position to dominate its geostrategic realm—that vast spatial arena large enough to affect the areas within its strategic military reach. It is characterized by a distinct set of interrelationships expressed in terms of patterns of circulation, economic orientation, and historic, cultural, and political traditions. Place, movement, and perspective combine to shape a geostrategic realm.

Realms are defined by "Continentality" and "Maritimity." These are terms that not only describe lands and climates: they also describe outlooks. The Eurasian Continental World is more isolated, more inwardly-oriented, and more heavily endowed with raw materials than its maritime counterpart. Its people have deep ties to the land. Whatever happens to the Soviet Union, whether it loses such republics as the Baltics, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia, or remains intact, there will be a Russia and some allied or subordinate republics to occupy the Eurasian Heartland. It will remain a large, well-endowed, and technologically advanced power, capable of influencing events in much of the rest of the world.

China, too, belongs to this realm. It is not part of the Maritime World as portrayed by Mackinder and Spykman in their times, and Richard Nixon in his. The vast majority of Chinese live off the land, not from sea trade. Even with China's recent spurt in commerce, it only accounts for 1.5 percent of the world's imports and exports. It is the mountain that holds a spiritual, mystical attraction for the Chinese, not the sea. And it is the common border that strategically links the U.S.S.R. and China. They cannot turn their backs on one another; they have to find a modus vivendi. Even though political change in the Soviet Union is in sharp contrast to China's quashing of political democracy stirrings, the Chinese resistance to change must inevitably give way, especially as its openings to a market economy continue. When both continental powers no longer are trapped by competing versions of Marxist ideology and enjoy more open systems, they are likely to find more in common, including the recognition that mutual strategic vulnerability is better served than conflict.

South Asia belongs to neither geostrategic realm. It has separate geopolitical regional status. In their early history, especially from its Indus Valley beginnings in 3,000 B.C. to Roman times, the Indians were seafaring peoples and colonizers. Since then they have been continentally oriented, becoming a source for special raw materials and a market for imported goods during the British rule. As an independent geopolitical region dominated by India, South Asia remains rural-based and continental. This does not minimize the growing importance to the region of overseas trade, shipping, and modern-day immigration. However, the basic orientation is inward (India's merchandise trade is only one-third that of China's)—a condition which explains the limited impact of extraregional contacts upon the geopolitical objectives of the various states of South Asia.

If trade interactions were the only criterion for defining geopolitical regions, then South America and Subsahara Africa surely would not qualify as separate geopolitical regions. The trade links of their individual states are with other parts of the Maritime realm, especially the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, the subregions of both South America and Africa are clearer political, military, and economic arenas than are their larger regions.

In rationalizing the geopolitical unity of the continent, one can argue that the weight of eastern South America is overwhelming. Moreover, Chile's strategic interrelationships with Argentina, the vulnerability of the Central Andean countries' trans-montane rainforests and savannas to Brazil, and Colombia's ties with Venezuela inhibit western South America from gaining independent geopolitical status on a par with the east.

Subsahara Africa's subdivisions, Southern Africa, Western and Central Africa, and East Africa are arenas of far more intense political, cultural and military interaction than is the region as a whole. When the two strongest regional powers, Nigeria and South Africa, sort out their internal problems, they may, indeed, carve out two distinct geopolitical regions, with the smaller, weaker central and eastern subdivisions being included within them. This would create two geopolitical regions—the South and East Lands of the Indian and South Atlantic, and the West and Central Lands of the Mid-Atlantic. For the present, Subsahara Africa still reflects much of its colonial heritage. The former French and former British subunits retain a strong group identity, but not of sufficient political-military importance to give them geopolitical uniqueness.

On the other hand, intraregional trade is a major factor in linking Anglo-America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb and Offshore Asia. Tourism, immigration, and petroleum flow characterize Anglo-America, and immigration and language bind the Maghreb to Maritime Europe.

Japan's situation as the dominant economic and political power in Offshore Asia is unique because of its reluctance to exercise military pressures. This is the reverse of South Asia, where India freely applies military options, or in East Asia, where China has been militarily involved in both Korea and Indo-China. The Russian Heartland organizes its region through economic exchange, migration of Slavs, and military force.

The Quarter-Sphere of Marginality

While we speak of a world system, we are mindful that it does not really span the entire globe. Perhaps it never will. Parts of the world are outside the modern economic system and do not benefit from the exchange that is so important to the developmental process.

Much of Subsahara Africa and South America south of the Orinoco lies outside the world economic system. The trade of these two regions is only 3 percent of world exchange. With the exception of pockets of modernity, in such countries as Brazil, Argentina and Chile, and in South Africa, these regions are relatively untouched by the capital flows, technology transfer, and specialization of industry that characterizes the Developed Market Economies (70 percent of world trade), Continental Eurasia (10 percent), and South Asia (8 percent). The continents centering around the South Atlantic and their bordering oceans represent the quarter of the world's land and ocean areas which can be referred to as the "Quarter-Sphere of Marginality."

While dominated by the U.S. and European Community power centers, the Quarter-Sphere is marginal in a strategic sense. Naval and air strike forces, long-range air weapons and satellite surveillance capabilities have minimized the significance to the Maritime World of Southern Continental land bases. Moreover, pipelines and Suez now account for as much oil movement as the shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope. The Panama Canal takes most of the Pacific shipping trade not oriented to the U.S. West Coast.

Economically, the Quarter-Sphere suffers from chronic over-production of commercial crops and minerals, competition from other parts of the world, substitutes, and changing consumer tastes. The postindustrial regions no longer regard the two southern Continents as the potential storehouses of the world.

As a result of these changes, panregionalism has become an outdated concept (O'Loughlin and van der Wusten 1990). Even though it is pursuing a massive debt reduction program, the U.S. seems unlikely to promote large new

capital flows, business developments, or aid programs to South America, nor is Europe apt to do more than it is already doing in Subsahara Africa, given its involvement with the lands to its east.

The burdens of high debt, low international trade levels, overpopulation, low life expectancy, and low caloric consumptions will continue to plague the two southern continents, unless the Quarter-Sphere receives much more development aid. But it will not receive substantially new help unless there is a sea-change in the attitudes of the wealthy of world. This means letting strategic and economic disinterest give way to humanitarian considerations, and concerns that local conflicts or the acquisition of mass weapons would affect global stability.

Shatterbelts

The concept of the Shatterbelt has long been of interest to geographers who also have used the terms "Crush Zone" or "Shatter Zone." Mahan, Fairgrieve, and Hartshorne contributed pioneering studies of such regions. Mahan (1900) referred to the instability of the zone between the 30° and 40° parallels in Asia as being caught between Britain and Russia. Fairgrieve (1915) referred to a Crush Zone of small buffer states between the seapowers of the Eurasian Heartland, from Northern and Eastern Europe to the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Siam, and Korea. During the second World War, Hartshorne (1944) analyzed the Shatter Zone of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic, advocating a post-World War II Federation.

The operational definition for Shatterbelts used here is: strategically-oriented regions which are politically fragmented areas of competition between the Maritime and Continental Realms. By the end of the 1940s, two such atomized regions had emerged—the Middle East and Southeast Asia. They were not geographically coincident with previous Shatter Zones because the global locus of geostrategic competition had shifted. The former East and Central Europe Shatterbelt had fallen within the Soviet strategic orbit, and the Maritime and Continental Worlds became divided by a sharp boundary in Korea.

In discussions of the typology of the Shatterbelt, it has been pointed out by Kelly (1986) that other parts of the world are also characterized by high degrees of conflict and atomization. It is true that wars, revolts, and coups are chronic in the Caribbean, South America and South Asia. The distinguishing feature of the Shatterbelt, however, is that it presents an equal playing field to two or more competing powers operating from different geostrategic realms.

Thus South Asia is not a Shatterbelt. India's dominance in a divided South Asia is not seriously threatened by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or China. Moreover, the Caribbean is under America's military strategic and tactical sway, and the Soviet penetration of Cuba did not threaten U.S. military control of the region. Had this been the case, the U.S. would have mounted massive invasion and overthrown Castro, rather than launch the comic-opera Bay of Pigs adventure. Just as the defections of Yugoslavia and Albania did not undermine Soviet military primacy in East and Central Europe, so have Cuba and Nicaragua not put America's control of the Caribbean at risk.

Shatterbelt areas and their boundaries are fluid. During the 1970s and 80s, Subsahara Africa also became a Shatterbelt. The Soviet Union used its Cuban surrogate as well as its Eastern European satellites to provide military and technical support to Ethiopia, Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique. Its adjoining Middle Eastern bases were important jumping-off points for Africa. The U.S.S.R. also made political inroads into Guinea, Mali, Congo, and Tanzania. With the retreat of the U.S.S.R. and its allies from Africa, the region has shifted back to the Maritime Realm (Fig. 3).

Another major change in the geopolitical map is that Southeast Asia has also lost its Shatterbelt status. Its insular and southern peninsular portions have become economically and politically part of Offshore Asia and the Maritime World. Malaysia and Thailand now enjoy considerable industrial development, their economies linked to those of Japan and the U.S. This has followed Singapore's remarkable growth as part of the Maritime realm, and the realignment of Indonesia with the West and its Offshore Asian neighbors.

Meanwhile, with the rapid withdrawal of Soviet support from Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Indochina as a whole are soon likely to fall within the East Asian sphere. Vietnam will have to find some accommodation with China. What

will be left of the region is an isolated and impoverished Myanmar, with almost no foreign trade or other contacts. When the military regime is eventually overthrown, and the country opens itself to the world, it will probably become reoriented to South Asia.

Presently, then, the only remaining Shatterbelt is the Middle East. It, too, is in transition. It is tilting towards the Maritime Realm, as the Soviet Union has suddenly ceased to be a major economic and military supplier, at least for the time being. The U.S.S.R. remains sensitive to its 1400-mile border with Turkey and Iran and the Muslim peoples on both sides of its borders, but its era of broad regional penetration, with bases in the Red and Arabian Seas, and the Eastern Mediterranean, seems over.

When the Soviet Union and the U.S. were equal competitors, there was some measure of regional equilibrium. The two stabilizers fueled local conflict, but limited its escalation and stopped it when they felt they might become directly dragged in. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, when both superpowers could not wholeheartedly support either of the contestants, there were attempts to keep a military balance. Now the region is in disequilibrium, with the U.S. temporarily the single dominant external power.

In the post-Gulf War world, however, Europe is likely to exert more influence on the Middle Eastern scene, and to emerge as the second major intrusive power. Its influence on Iraq, Iran and Turkey is likely to be greater than that of the U.S. The lead taken by Britain and the European Community in proposing a "safe haven" for Kurds in Northern Iraq is a case in point. So was the German effort to provide food and supplies to the Kurds in Iran. In both instances, the U.S. was pressured to respond by supporting and adopting these initiatives.

With these two as the major intrusive powers and the Soviet Union playing a secondary role, a new balance can be developed. Indeed, the Soviet Union may play a stabilizing role between Europe and America, in pursuing its own agenda. Shift of the "power see-saw" should be less frequent and rapid than they have been in the past (Fig. 4). The region will remain a Shatterbelt if the U.S. and the European Community fail to forge a common agenda. Such dissension might encourage the U.S.S.R. to reenter the arena more vigorously. With a common American and European approach, however, the Middle East is likely to become part of the Maritime World.

Besides outside intrusions, the Middle East is now a Shatterbelt because it is highly fragmented internally. The region contains six regional powers: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria and Turkey. They in turn cast their shadows over smaller states or separate groups within those states. The alliances among these states and their subordinates are fluid. Striking a balance among the six is complicated. The U.S. and others can help in the quest for regional stability, particularly by pressing for elimination of weapons of mass destruction, reduction of conventional arms, and commitments to act against new regional aggressors, but outside powers cannot guarantee against continued turbulence. The challenge is to contain regional tensions and to minimize their impacts since it is not likely that they can soon been eliminated.

The Gulf War demonstrated the high degree of interaction that characterizes the region. Every Middle Eastern state and some of the major ethnic and religious groups became directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. Interpenetrating seas, the Mediterranean, Red, and Arabian, and the Turkish and Iranian land bases played militarily significant roles. Moreover, oil pipeline networks, intraregional migration and capital flows, and water, all emerged as factors that shape the regional personality. These are in addition to the overlays of Arabism and Islam.

A concluding note about Shatterbelts has to do with the process of entropy. The very intrusive forces that contribute to the creation of Shatterbelts can also contribute to their peaceful development. Southeast Asia was drawn into Offshore Asia because there was so much energy transport from the latter to the former. Thus, what only a decade ago was a Shatterbelt in high entropy, is now contributing substantially to the larger low-entropy region. The Middle East could, under peaceful circumstances, benefit considerably from energy exchange with Maritime Europe and lower its entropy level. Eastern Europe, which has experienced rapid increase in entropy, is about to benefit from substantial energy transport from Maritime Europe. Rapid lowering of East Europe's entropy level is the best guarantee of its not becoming the Shatterbelt that it once was.




Figure 3. Major geopolitical regional changes from end of World War II to present. Subsaharan Africa became a Shatterbelt in the 1970s but has reverted to the Maritime Realm. The post-World War II Southeast Asian Shatterbelt has disappeared. East Europe has split off from the Heartland to become a new region linking the realms.




Figure 4. Equilibrium and the Middle East seesaw. From the 1950s to the 1980s, a static and tenuous form of equilibrium existed in the Middle East Shatterbelt because the two superpowers were in balance. Local and regional disturbances occurred as regional powers shifted their superpower alliances. In 1991, the region was thrown into imbalance as Iraq was defeated and the U.S. became the dominant intrusive power.

Gateway Regions

The world is currently in disequilibrium because of the substantial differences in entropic levels between its two geostrategic realms. The Soviet and Chinese cores of Continental Eurasia have medium levels of entropy that are rapidly increasing. They have brought their human and natural resource bases close to exhaustion as they closed their systems to outside social, political, market and technological energies that could have promoted innovation and renewal. In contrast, the cores of the Maritime World and many other parts of the Developed Market Economies, particularly the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, or Australia or Mexico, are at low levels of entropy. Equilibrium between the two realms will be restored only when their entropic levels are closer to equal.

The most promising geopolitical mechanism now for restoring the balance between the two realms is the emergence of Central and Eastern Europe as a Gateway region (Fig. 5). Such a region could facilitate the transfer of new energies into the faltering Soviet core. Extending on the west from the Oder-Neisse Rivers and the Harz and Bohemian Mountains to the Northern Adriatic Sea, and the east to the borders of the U.S.S.R., the European Gateway will be fully open to economic forces from the east and west. Its national politics and economic structures are adopting the West European models, but it will have to find a military posture that does not challenge Soviet security goals. With the exception of Greece, this region is composed of that middle tier of states between Germany and Russia whose independence and stability Mackinder (1919) felt to be crucial to Eurasian and world stability.

While demilitarization is not a viable option




Figure 5. Prospective Gateway States, conceived as specialized exchange sovereignties which will be politically, culturally, and economically independent of the states in which they are now located but militarily subordinate to them. As centers of economic and technological innovation, they will be important links in the integrating world system.

for the region, a form of "Finlandization" is a reasonable substitute for the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. This may occur through bilateral arrangements which guarantee that East European defense forces will oppose any attempts by Western armies to use their territories as jumping-off points against the Soviet Union, while at the same time provide for liaison between them and NATO (or West European Union).

The promise of the Gateway region is that it will facilitate the transfer of economic innovation from West to East, and, ultimately, the reverse. As Eastern European countries and former East Germany make their painful transitions to a market economy having abandoned Comecon, they should be able to exploit their low cost, fairly well-educated labor pool and raw material base and play a special role in serving as partners with Western transnational enterprises in developing joint agreements with the Soviet Union. Moreover, their experiences in balancing opportunities for economic growth with pressures to maintain some of the economic egalitarianism enjoyed during the past four decades should be of benefit to the U.S.S.R. In the future, joint Soviet-East European companies may also focus on the Western market.

The region has the potential for developing as a major source of high quality manufacturers for its own and the Soviet market, as it benefits from Western capital, equipment, credits, and managerial and technical know-how. This surely is of interest to the U.S.S.R., which has had to accept high-priced, shoddy goods from its Communist satellites (as well as vice versa) in return for raw materials. Improved, modernized agriculture in such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany can find export markets in the U.S.S.R. once their own consumer demands are met.

While the basis for trade within the former Soviet bloc will no longer be regulated by force and ideological considerations, the trading framework should remain strong. Soviet raw materials such as oil and gas remain crucial to the trade exchange. With its technological capacities and Western capital, the U.S.S.R. may also be able to develop to the point where it exports quality manufactures—e.g., automobiles and computers, in exchange for Eastern Europe's textiles or machine tools.

The question might be raised as to whether East and Central Europe might not revert to a Shatterbelt rather than become the Gateway region that has been posited. This is doubtful. The European Community and the Soviet Union would find competition over the region to be counterproductive. Maritime Europe's concerns are Soviet military power. The U.S.S.R. needs West European economic help. These concerns and needs balance one another. They are best addressed through cooperation, not through the competition that makes for Shatterbelts.

A gateway region has "hinges"—key states which take the lead as economic and social mediators in opening up the region in both directions. The eastern part of Germany can be such a hinge. So, potentially, can Slovenia for exchange between Maritime Europe and the Balkans, and the Baltic states for Northern and Northwest Europe and the Heartland.

Another Gateway region that may emerge, although it is presently geopolitically linked to Anglo-America, is the Caribbean and Central America. It is and will remain within the security orbit of the U.S., a condition never realistically in doubt even when the U.S.S.R. had footholds in Cuba and Nicaragua. The imminent disappearance of the Soviet presence in the region gives greater scope for such regional powers as Mexico and Venezuela to extend their influence. The U.S., on the other hand, with less reason to focus on military issues, can commit more of its resources to regional development.

What makes this Gateway especially important to the U.S. is its role as a source of immigrants. With a native demographic slowdown and the growing difficulties of enlisting its poorly educated, drug-ridden underclass into the labor force, the U.S. draws upon the pool of labor from the lands to its south. In addition, Mexico represents a major focus for "off-shore" American manufacturing, and the Caribbean basin as a whole has the potential for attracting Japanese capital as manufacturing points of entry to the American market.

Finally, the Caribbean's continued growth as Anglo-America's winter tourist focus is bright, in the face of the demands of aging, wealthier populations in the north. Of more dubious value as a gateway is the role of the region now in the drug trade. Among the "hinge" states in the region are Colombia, a link to the Andean

Table 1. Prospective Gateway States

By early 21st century		By mid-21st century
Catalonia	Madeira Islands	Alaska
Cyprus (unified)	Mount Lebanon	Azores
East Nicaragua	Pashtunistan	British Columbia
Eritrea	Puerto Rico	Hawaii
Estonia	Punjab	Northern Ireland
Gaza/West Bank	Quebec	Northern Mexico
Hong Kong/Shenzhen	Slovenia	Soviet Far East
Kashmir	Tamil Eelam	West Australia
Latvia	Vascongadas (Basque)	
Lithuania		

countries, and Venezuela as an oil exporter to the U.S. An independent Puerto Rico can become a hinge gateway.

Gateway States

The characteristics of Gateway states will vary in detail but not in their overall context. Politically and culturally they are distinct historic culture hearths, with separate languages, often separate religions or national churches, higher degrees of education, and favorable access by sea or land to external areas.

Economically Gateways tend to be more highly developed than the core areas of their host states, for they are often endowed with strong entrepreneurial and trading traditions. When they are sources of migration because of overpopulation, they acquire links to groups overseas that can provide capital flows and technological know-how.

Small in area and population, and frequently lying athwart key access routes, Gateways are often of military value to their host states, whose security needs require defense guarantees should the Gateways acquire political independence. While they may possess a highly specialized natural or human resource which provides an export base, they lack self-sufficiency and depend upon the host state for raw materials and a substantial market base. The models for such states have existed historically in Sheba, Tyre and Nabataea; in the Hanseatic League and Lombard city-states; in Venice; and in Trieste and Zanzibar. Andorra, Monaco, Finland, Bahrain, and Malta are modern-day versions. So were Lebanon and Cyprus before they were dismembered.

Located mainly along the border of the world's geostrategic realms and its geopolitical regions, or within an integrating Europe, Gateway states are optimally situated for specialized manufacturing, trade, tourism and financial service functions, thus stimulating global economic, social and political interaction. With independence, they will accelerate the trend of these borders from zones of conflict to zones of accommodation (Fig. 5 and Table 1).

The emergence of such states can facilitate the creation of boundaries of accommodation as foreseen by Lionel Lyde (1926) more than six decades ago. Since World War II and until recently, the boundary between the world's two great geostrategic realms has been the world's most unstable conflict zone (from Greece to the Koreas, to the Chinese-India borderland, to Vietnam and Afghanistan). Now, however, war along this border zone has largely abated. Moreover, the level of conflict along geopolitical regional borders has in recent years not been higher than the world norm. This is in contrast to the world's Shatterbelt regions which have experienced the highest intensity and frequency of war.

The addition of substantial numbers of new Gateway states to the international system is in keeping with developmental theory, because these will be economically-specialized states which will help to link the system as a whole and its various parts. Far from the traditional territorial unitary or federated states, whose goals included self-sufficiency and defense capacities, such states will be mini-trading states with qualified sovereignty. They will represent no military threat to their larger neighbors.

Describing Gateway states as contributors to a more peaceful and stable system does not imply that a few Gateways, such as Eritrea, Gaza/West Bank or Tamil Eelam, will not have

emerged except through bloody military conflict. But by and large, the decision to establish them will be mutually desired by the involved parties and will not, as was the case for many independent states emerging out of decolonization, mean complete secession and unqualified sovereignty. The conflict that will attend the emergence of most Gateways will be minimal—limited by the asymmetry in strength of the opposing parties.

As the world system becomes more developed, it will require that certain portions of existing states achieve flexibility in their interactions with their previous hosts. The ideal advanced general system has countless numbers of parts or hinges that can connect with each other without having to move through rigidly controlled, hierarchical pathways. The importance of having a more flexible international system within which states are linked globally, regionally, and sectorially, is that it can cope more easily with shocks, as blockage points are by-passed and the system feeds on a multiplicity of nodes. In microelectronic circuitry, or chips, gates permit currents to pass through arrays of transistors. Transistors are made faster by making them smaller, giving the current less distance to travel. This applies to the potential of gateway states to make the world system more responsive.

Much has been written about the Baltic States and their drives for independence. The outcome of the recent turbulent "negotiations" (as perceived by the Lithuanians) or "discussions" (as termed by Soviet leadership), culminated by the collapse of the Soviet central government, has been international recognition of the Baltic Republics. Their emergence as Gateway states is thus imminent. Most likely, the U.S.S.R. will insist upon full military control of Klaipeda (Memel), a major ice-free military port with links to the Kalinigrad R.S.F.S.R. oblast which, with Lithuanian independence, would become a Russian territorial enclave. Klaipeda's rail and road contacts with Kaliningrad and with Byelorussia and Moscow would have to be secured through transit rights. Elsewhere in the Baltic, the U.S.S.R. would want political and cultural rights guarantees for the relatively large Slavic populations in Latvia (41 percent) and Estonia (33 percent); this is only a minor problem in Lithuania where Slavs are 11 percent of the populace.

The Baltic States, free in their own religious values, with independent currencies linked to the European one and the power to control immigration and customs, could take off economically and become a major focus for Western capital and trade interested in the Soviet market. They need Soviet energy, raw materials, and a Common Market with the U.S.S.R. for their economies. At the same time, they can be gateways to the West which can facilitate Soviet perestroika and its turn to a market economy.

Estonia has all the necessary ingredients for becoming a Gateway state, a state which has gained independent sovereignty although with certain residual and as yet undefined economic ties to the Soviet Union. It is quite clear that Estonia could never have achieved sovereignty by force of arms. But political independence, as well as cultural freedom for the Estonians and their ability to control immigration and thus preserve indigenous ethnic control, is a price that the Russians proved willing to pay.

Such willingness is based on Soviet self-interest—the prospect of a positive impact on the Soviet economy that a Baltic state can set through its economic flexibility and innovation as a bridge between East and West; an exchange base for Westerners seeking to open up the Soviet market. This is the context within which the U.S.S.R. had already decided to give Estonia free rein over its economy, including the handing over of state-owned (Soviet) factories to Estonia. An Estonian state that can preserve the 60-percent ethnic mix, including its Lutheran traditions; have currency that can be freely traded with a West European common currency should it emerge; and can organize itself as an economic free zone will be as helpful to the U.S.S.R. as to Estonia itself.

There are limits to how far the U.S.S.R. can go in responding to separatist movements. The Ukraine and Kazakhstan are parts which, if lost, would dismember the whole. This is not the case for the Baltic republics whose future security depends upon coexistence with Moscow. The outcome may produce a political model with applicability in many parts of the world, including Slovenia's breaking from Yugoslavia, or Western Australia from Australia, or Shenzhen from China to join Hong Kong.

As with the Baltic Republics, Slovenia could gain qualified independence without dismembering Yugoslavia. Indeed Slovenia seems to have won its relatively bloodless battle with the

Serbs. The absence of Serbian and indeed substantial numbers of other minorities, save German-speaking, in Slovenia makes its independence more feasible. This demographic picture is in sharp contrast to that of Croatia. There, the large Serbian minority of 600,000 is a majority or near-majority in Slavonia in eastern Croatia bordering Bosnia and Vojvodina, and also in parts of the southeast and south-center in the Krajina along the Bosnian boundary. The Serbs insist that there can be no independence for Croatia unless its Serbian regions are permitted to join Serbia. Croatian opposition to such territorial dismemberment has already resulted in heavy fighting that would surely turn into all-out war rather than the kind of low-level skirmishing that has taken place in Slovenia.

Joining Europe is no mere slogan for the Slovenes. Central European culturally, historically and geographically, in contrast to their eastward-oriented sister Yugoslavian Republics, and speaking a South Slavic language that uses Roman characters, Catholic Slovenes are more economically advanced than the Christian Orthodox Serbs. There are traditional links to Austria, Italy and Hungary on which to promote development. For eight centuries located within the southern border of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and prospering in their alpine valley and forested region well served with superhighways and modern housing, the Slovenes have the business and manufacturing skills to benefit from freedom to interact with Europe on their own terms. Establishment of Yugoslavia's first stock market in Ljublijana is a reflection of Slovene entrepreneurship.

When Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, limited fighting soon broke out between the Yugoslav army and Slovenia militia. On July 7, a tenuous cease-fire accord was arranged through the mediation of the European Community. Agreement to seek a peaceful solution could lead to a very loosely confederated Yugoslav structure, in which Slovenia is guaranteed control over its own financial affairs, a separate currency and monetary system, and independent status in international bodies (such as is held by the Ukraine and Byelorussia in the United Nations).

The dispute over control of customs posts along the Italian, Austrian and Hungarian borders could be resolved by joint Slovene-Federation customs teams, each responsible for goods destined to its respective region. Alternatively, customs revenues could be shared. In defense matters, Slovenia could be guarded by an all-Slovenian army operating under the umbrella of a federal army with a coordinated planning and command structure. In times of emergency, Slovenian authorities could invite other components of the federal force to enter the Republic. Conscription or recruiting would be a Slovenian prerogative. A Slovenia that emerged in such a form would be a prototypical Gateway state. Such a solution would protect Yugoslavia's security needs, continue to provide markets for raw materials from the Confederation to Slovenia, and facilitate industrial development and innovation that could be diffused to the southern republics.

Gateways may also be found among islands that have such limited defense and political foreign policy concerns that they can remain under the military umbrella of the countries to which they now belong. They can evolve as microstates because they have the ability to specialize in financial services, capital flows, and tourism. Sometimes they are ideal places for assembling manufactured parts into finished products. Some of the Gateway states, especially overpopulated islands, will have access to the capital and technical know-how of emigre populations who left crowded, agriculturally-impoverished, island bases but retain emotional familial ties.

The Madeira Islands, several hundred miles removed from the coast of Portugal, are a potential Gateway. Madeira is presently an autonomous region within Portugal. It has home rule over its regional budget and tourist development. However, its dreams of developing as an offshore banking center and free trade zone have long been delayed by central government bureaucracy in Lisbon. As a base for companies seeking to export to the European economic community after 1992, the Madeira free zone could be quite attractive.

The Madeiras need Portugal for the entry that is provided into the European Community. And Madeira has no incentive to take on defense burdens. But an arrangement that provides it with the independence to take economic advantage of its Atlantic basin location for exports to Europe, the U.S., and North Africa could free Portugal from what is now an economic burden and create in the Madeiras

a model for the development of Europe's poorer regions.

Quebec is also a Gateway candidate. With such status it could focus on exploiting its advantages in human and raw materials to be a successful partner in the emerging North American Free Trade Zone. So could a new Northern Mexico state, building upon the economic vitality of its Maquiladoras zone cities. Other examples are Alaska and Hawaii. Alaska, which has very small independence party, could make its own decisions on how to exploit petroleum and where to ship it, or on generating trade with the Soviet Far East. Hawaii could link the economies of Japan and the U.S. without being impeded by American law.

The European Community presents Gateway state opportunities for European peoples that have sought independence—in particular the Basques, Catalans and Walloons (although Walloonia may already have attained its desired status in Belgium's advanced confederal structure). These smaller groups could survive economically in a Europe without meaningful national political boundaries. The detachment of such ethnic or religious minorities from the mother country would create no security problems in a Europe with a unified defense posture. Moreover, many of the economic advantages the mother country enjoys from having these subregions within their economic borders could well be lost as the European community enters into the new era of "pooled sovereignty" in 1992—the culmination of a series of steps that combined both federalist and functionalist approaches (Wise 1991). Conversely, the burden for their support could be shared.

The listing of prospective Gateway states in Table I does not represent the only new states which are likely to be added to the current state system. Independence forces in colonial or trust territories such as the Polisaro of Western Sahara or the Kanakks of New Caledonia, or ethnic minorities within existing states seeking their national freedom, like the Armenians, the Moldavians, the Kurds, or the Croatians will reinforce the trend of national state proliferation. This proliferation has been cause for conflict and upheaval in much of the world since the end of the Second World War, as tribal and ethnic scores have been settled in the context of decolonization, and will continue to be so.

The distinct contribution of Gateways is that they can help stabilize the system because of their raison d'être as links in an increasingly interdependent world. Uniquely suited to furthering peace, such novel states can help fashion what Peter Taylor (1991) has referred to as a people-centered world map. Such a map is not an alternative to the state-centered map, but rather one which contains a substantial number of territorial units whose goals are essentially devoted to the interests of peoples, not states, and which binds together states and regions.

Individuals and groups live in various categories of multiple worlds. The individual operates in the worlds of family, work, recreation, school, friends and neighbors, religious communities and the like. Social groups or clans also live in multiple worlds. These worlds overlap in time and in space. When they are experienced totally independently at the individual level, the person becomes disfunctional. When they are handled in integrated fashion, the individual enjoys harmony.

The same holds true for our geopolitical lives. We live in a world system, a geopolitical region, a national state, a province or subnational state and a locality (urban or rural). While each of these territorially-framed units has separate functions, the trend is towards greater overlapping. Yeltsin seeks to conduct foreign policy on behalf of the Russian Republic, and at times in overt competition with the policies of Gorbachev; governors of various American states and even mayors of big cities sign economic and cultural agreements with foreign national states which have political overtones that infringe on Department of State prerogatives. As the world becomes more complex, this overlap will increase and so will the contradictions. Taylor (1989) points out that the enhancement of the world system, far from diminishing the importance of local forces, will culminate in the mobilization of peoples in regions.

Local forces and political power are often at odds with dominant national ideologies, as well as with the restraints imposed by the world system. Reconciling these differences within national states and within geopolitical regions is the most severe challenge that a highly developed and integrated system must face. Gateway states and regions have very special roles to play in reconciling these territorially-based differences.

Conclusion—Policy Implications

The world is still in its early stages of specialization and hierarchical integration. The two geostrategic realms are sorting out the relationships of their respective internal power centers. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor China has yet to achieve the national focus which will enable the Russian Heartland and East Asia to build a new chapter in Sino-Soviet relations from the ashes of their schism. In addition, they are opening their national systems economically and, increasingly, politically. Meanwhile, the U.S., the European Community and Japan have still to agree upon an allocation of global responsibilities in which America's specialized military capacities are tempered by its economic parity with the other two.

At the geopolitical level, the different regions are at different stages of development. Their power and influence cannot be comparatively measured by the same criteria. They have varied attributes depending on their particular settings, including the locational presence or absence of major powers. Regional states play differing roles within their regions, depending on their particular qualities and thus spatial and political-economic interactions with major powers and neighboring states. What helps to link the system is the drive of the less mature parts to rise to levels already achieved by the more mature sectors.

Development means greater strength and self-confidence for the individual parts. The world system since World War II has been hegemonic, characterized by attempts to regulate from the top. A more advanced system is one whose parts are more open, more capable of drawing in new energies, and more likely to find balance through self-regulation, either as the result of failure to achieve goals through war and competition or through cooperation.

If we are to go beyond the obvious in stating that this is a geopolitically complex and dynamic system, we must grapple with the policy implications of the framework that has been elaborated. "Objective" analyses cannot escape the experience and national biases of their authors. Mine is an analysis which reflects an American point of view. Its prescriptions are directed to American policy-making.

Here, then, are the conclusions to be drawn from some geopolitical concepts and issues that have been covered in this paper:

(1) The U.S. should unequivocally renounce the Nixon-era strategy that viewed the Sino-Soviet split as an important instrument for world equilibrium. Drawing Soviet military energies away from Europe is taking place because of the end of the Cold War, not because of the U.S.S.R.'s perception of an increased Chinese threat. The Soviet Union (especially the Russian Heartland) and China belong to one geostrategic realm. We should do what we can to promote the conversion of the Sino-Soviet barrier boundary to one of accommodation and decrease the instability between the two powers. U.S. and Japanese coordination at the economic and military levels can help. The two countries should also adopt the collateral objective of easing tensions between Vietnam and China.

(2) The U.S. has assumed the mantle of world military leadership. Germany and Japan are the cores of the Maritime realm's two other key geopolitical regions. We should not press these most important geostrategic partners to share in the military burden, because they would surely be perceived as threats by the U.S.S.R. and China, leading to system destabilization. We need to reduce our military arsenals to levels that we can maintain through our own efforts and without involving Germany and Japan. Such reductions will lower the global strategic arms race and bring greater peace dividends to all concerned. American nuclear and high-technology "overkill" has diverted our resources from pressing domestic social and environmental problems. It has also fueled the world arms trade that Pentagon suppliers depend upon to reduce unit costs.

(3) The U.S. should accelerate its withdrawal from many overseas bases. Air and sea technology make it possible to exercise power within the Maritime Realm without having to rely on a multitude of fixed land points. In general, land army overseas bases are unnecessary, as are nuclear weapons. Impoverished countries, whose people view us as colonial occupiers and/or are ruled by unstable regimes, are unsuitable partners. We should retain air and sea bases only where we are broadly welcomed as strategic partners, e.g., in Britain, Spain, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Turkey, Israel and Australia. Priority should also be maintained in Diego Garcia,

Puerto Rico, Guam, Panama, the Azores, and Singapore. Politically vulnerable are bases in South Korea, Thailand, Guantanamo, the Philippines, Greece, Morocco, and, if established, the Persian Gulf. We should leave them.

(4) In geopolitically independent South Asia, the U.S. should recognize the primacy of India as the core of the region. India's concerns over our military alliance with Pakistan are legitimate. This alliance drove India into the arms of the U.S.S.R. We should abandon this military agreement and also recognize the dangers to world stability inherent in Pakistan's nuclear arms program. The U.S. should, however, diplomatically encourage Pakistan's support of a free Kashmir, perhaps in consonance with the U.S.S.R. A cooperative effort between America and the Soviet Union to facilitate Kashmir's emergence as a Gateway state could lead to greater regional stability than the current policies whereby each superpower arms its ally.

(5) The Middle East Shatterbelt could shift to the Maritime World. However, this will not happen if America seeks to impose a PAX AMERICANA on the region. Maritime Europe must be treated as a full military and political partner in all U.S. efforts to achieve security in the Gulf, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to restore peace in Lebanon. If there is a compelling strategic reason for relocating the Forward Headquarters of the U.S. Central Command to Bahrain and placing a brigade in Saudi Arabia, there is even more compelling a reason to make this an allied effort. With two cooperating balancers and respect for Soviet concerns, the swing of the regional seesaw would be moderated substantially.

Moreover, the Soviet Union should be involved in trilateral peace efforts. Resumption of American military arms sales to allied Middle Eastern regional powers or their subordinate states will only undermine regional stability and encourage other outside powers to join in a renewed arms race. Since 1983, about 60 percent of world arms trade has gone to the Middle East. Continuation of these transfers is an invitation to future disasters such as the Gulf War and the various Arab-Israeli conflicts.

(6) In our foreign aid priorities, we should give special attention to Gateway regions and states. These are areas with great promise for integrating and stabilizing the global system. The initially rigid American policy in support of the unity of the Yugoslav Confederation was misguided. Slovenia and Croatia are not the same. Slovenian independence can facilitate Yugoslavia's economic development. Croatian independence has brought civil war and chaos. In fact, and under pressure from several European countries, the Bush administration did begin to back off from its commitment to an undivided Yugoslavia during the Slovenian crisis of the summer of 1991. Freedom is not only the right of territorially-distinct people like the Balts that were involuntarily forced into national unions. It is also the prerogative of a nation that has found an historical union to be repressive. The Baltic states seek emancipation; Slovenia wants a divorce. Diplomatic nuances aside, both desires are equally valid.

(7) Although the Quarter-Sphere of Marginality is strategically irrelevant, it must not be ignored economically by the Maritime Realm. Humanitarianism and practical considerations require a reallocation of American aid towards the South Atlantic lands and away from the present handful of military allies—six of which receive 90 percent of our foreign aid. Without development, the Quarter-Sphere will experience ever-increasing levels of conflict, thus defeating efforts to stabilize the world system in its entirety.

(8) The emergence of regional trading blocs—in Western Europe, in North America, in South America, and in the Pacific Rim—could prove serious challenges to the world's open system. They might promote protectionism, inefficiencies, and monopoly competition within the blocs. Extending these blocs along full panregional lines would not improve matters, even if it were politically feasible. Global equilibrium requires an open global system.

We geographers have much to learn and much to contribute to the field of geopolitical analysis. We have a strong tradition of past scholarly efforts in the field, and are building on this tradition to make novel and fresh impacts on the science of the relations among states, peoples and organizations. The richness of geopolitical topics and approaches in the current literature and at recent annual meetings of the Association and at numerous international seminars leads to the conclusion that we are experiencing a major resurgence in perhaps the oldest of geography's subfields—political geography. This is timely and important for the geographic discipline in its entirety.

Postscript

This article went to press at the peak of revolutionary change in the Soviet Union. The failed Communist coup d'etat on August 19–21, 1991 spelled an end to the Communist Party's economic and administrative structure and led to the collapse of central government and the crumbling of the Union. Seventy-one years of Communist rule have now been wiped away in a bloodless revolution.

The final outcome of the struggle to forge a new flexible and multifunctional national union that will provide an umbrella for those republics that opt for confederation, federation, associate membership or an economic union, is by no means clear. But if the unity of Heartland is to be maintained, it will be through a "bottom up" rather than "top down" approach to governance. Collective military security, economic exchange, international foreign policy commitments and control of the nuclear arsenal are functions the republics are most likely to delegate to a new federal center. As long as Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan can agree to some form on confederalism, the long-term prospects for the Heartland's revival are favorable.

Meanwhile the Baltic States have received recognition from Europe and the U.S. and applied for UN membership. Moreover, leading forces in the Soviet Union and especially Russia have dropped their opposition to Baltic independence. On the other hand, the need for these breakaway states to secure their economic exchange base with the Soviet republics as well as the Union's concerns with access to Kaliningrad and the sea, are bringing heavy pressure on both sides to develop mechanisms for gateway status.

Similar exchange-state structures are being discussed for Slovenia and Eritrea. Impending independence for these two territories brings to the forefront the need for Serbia and Slovenia to maintain economic trade and financial channels, and for Ethiopia to be guaranteed access to Eritrean Red Sea ports.

In recent weeks, Western euphoria over the triumph of democracy in the Soviet Union has been quickly tempered by the spectre of political atomization in the Heartland and elsewhere—fears over the consequences of local wars and unrest, and loss of central control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the intensity of the Revolutionary process has brought war to Yugoslavia and the threat of war within some of the Heartland's republics. But the prospects are that such strife will be geographically limited, and that international and regional efforts will be able to mediate the controversies.

Political systems that unravel so quickly are indeed cause for concern. The basis for this unraveling, the popular urge and will for democratic and human rights, also offers the hope that novel, more responsive systems are in process of being forged that will speedily contribute to a new, more stable, and peaceful map of the world.

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