Check for updates

Special issue on Governing (in)security in the postcolonial world

SECURITY DIALOGUE

Challenging environments: Danger, resilience and the aid industry

Security Dialogue
43(5) 475–492
© The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0967010612457975
sdi.sagepub.com
SAGE

Mark Duffield
Global Insecurities Centre, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract

Despite the widespread perception of danger, the aid industry continues to expand within challenging political environments. As a way of reducing risk, this expansion has been accompanied by the 'bunkerization' of international aid workers. While this development is largely viewed by the industry as an unfortunate response to a decline in external security, a more holistic approach is used here to explain the consequent paradox of liberal interventionism: an expansion that is simultaneously a remoteness of international aid workers from the societies in which they operate. The demise of modernist legal, moral and political constraints, together with a decline in the political patronage that aid agencies enjoy, has been important in shaping the new risk terrain. At the same time, these changes embody a profound change in the way contingency is approached. Earlier modernist forms of protection have been replaced by postmodernist calls for resilience and the acceptance of risk as an opportunity for enterprise and reinvention. Within the aid industry, however, field-security training represents a countervailing attempt to govern aid workers through anxiety. Resilience, in the form of 'care of the self' techniques, becomes a therapeutic response to the fears induced in this way. Viewed from this perspective, apart from reducing risk, the bunker has important therapeutic functions in a world that aid workers no longer understand or feel safe in.

Keywords

challenging environments, resilience, aid industry, bunkerization, anxiety, governance, remote management

Introduction: A decline in global security?

The end of the Cold War, and the subsequent ability of the international aid industry to expand within previously denied areas of ongoing conflict, heralded a profound change in the geopolitics of aid. Welcomed by the aid industry at the time, this expansion is an international relations exemplar of the demise of the world-historic modernist project. Modernism is used here to indicate the broad sociopolitical, economic and cultural ensemble that reached its zenith around the middle of the 20th century. It included a commitment to welfare and New Deal states, comprehensive public planning and service standardization, industrial Fordism, insurance-based forms of social

Corresponding author:
Mark Duffield
Email: m.duffield@bristol.ac.uk

protection and, internationally, independent developmental states within a Westphalian world system (Berman, [1982] 2010; Graham and Marvin, 2001; O'Malley, 2009). Reflecting the postmodernist turn, aid expansion in ongoing conflict is implicated, for example, in the erosion of Westphalian state sovereignty, the weakening of international law in favour of the 'might is right' morality of liberal exceptionalism (Douzinas, 2003), and the rise of consequentialist ethics and selective coalition-based interventionism (ICISS, 2001; Slim, 1997). Moreover, as explored in this article, it involved the dissolution of earlier modernist forms of disaster management and their associated technologies of humanitarian rescue (Hewitt, 1983). The way in which emergencies are understood has also shifted – away from an understanding in which they are seen as something external to society, toward one where they are regarded as being an inevitable attribute of its internal functioning and, as such, requiring urgent biopolitical governance.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the expansion of aid agencies within today's so-called challenging environments seems to be inversely related to the political patronage such agencies enjoy within host societies. During the Cold War, aid agencies expected and received protection not only from host governments, but also from the armed groups and rebel movements they provisioned (Baitenmann, 1990; Duffield and Prendergast, 1994). Today, not only is it taken for granted that host governments are either unable or unwilling to provide protection (United Nations, 2001), but there is also a growing problem of state harassment, political impunity and humanitarian denial (Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, 2011; World Food Programme, 2009). This is compounded by an apparent decline in the political influence and involvement of donor governments (Egeland et al., 2011).

Liberal states greeted the end of the Cold War with the optimistic belief that a rare opportunity had arisen to make the world a better and safer place. In establishing this New World Order, what subsequently became known as *liberal interventionism* (Blair, 1999), with its monotonous incantation that you cannot have peace without development nor development without peace, assigned a strategic role to the aid industry (Duffield, 2001). Indeed, the new post-Cold War ability to intervene in politically contested challenging environments saw an unprecedented industry expansion at every level: geographical reach, funding availability, the agencies involved, and the range and complexity of their responsibilities. Whereas the 40 years of the Cold War had witnessed just 13 UN peacekeeping operations, in the 6 years between 1988 and 1994, 21 were launched. Compared to the early 1990s, humanitarian funding from government sources increased sixfold to more than $12 billion by 2010. At the same time, estimates of the numbers of international aid workers employed by UN humanitarian agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and international NGOs now exceeds 200,000 (for an overview, see Collinson and Elhawary, 2012: 8, 11). If anything, these figures are underestimates, since they ignore private donations, the emergence of new for-profit actors and, importantly, the fact that around 90% of all aid workers are locally recruited (Egeland et al., 2011: 31).

The surge in liberal interventionism has been widely felt in the global south. At the same time, its intent to remake the world according to liberal freedoms and market values has never been in doubt (Ignatieff, 2003). The process of 'catalysing change and transforming *whole* societies' (Stiglitz, 1998: 3, emphasis in orginal), however, has proven more difficult than first imagined. Nor has it always been welcomed by those being transformed. Even before the foreign policy debacles of Iraq and Afghanistan, the initial sense of hope that launched the New World Order had long dimmed. While liberal interventionism is alive and well, in comparison with the early 1990s, a more cautious mood now prevails (compare Fukuyama, 2002, 2012). As frontline actors in the attempt to transform whole societies, aid agencies have inevitably experienced the friction and

tensions this can engender. Helped by periodic attacks on UN staff and aid workers, such as the August 2011 bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja by Nigerian fundamentalists, which left eleven people dead, today's more hesitant disposition has also penetrated the aid industry (Van Brabant, 2010). While the empirical evidence is unclear regarding the extent to which, and under what conditions, aid work is actually becoming more dangerous (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012; Fast, 2010; Stoddard et al., 2006), the industry itself has made up its own mind.

Compared to the past, the *perception* among aid agencies that they are facing increased external risks is both *widespread* and *firmly held.* The extensive security measures that aid agencies have adopted since the mid-1990s provide evidence of this (Bruderlein and Gassmann, 2006). Periodically reinforced by attacks like those in Nigeria or Afghanistan, but regardless of the extent to which one can generalize from such events, the dominant aid response has been for the rescue industry to harden itself 'by strengthening protection and more readily adopting deterrence measures' (Van Brabant, 2010: 8). For host populations, the most visible of these deterrence measures has been the widespread retreat of international aid workers into the aid world's proliferating *Green Zones* – that is, the embassy complexes, UN and international NGO compounds, residential units and leisure facilities that, interconnected by secure transport corridors, merge to form defended archipelagos of international space. The iconic image of this hardening spatial separation is the *fortified aid compound*. As a more or less formally demarcated area of private international space, the aid compound has a long history. What is new, however, is its overt fortification. Blocked roads, double walls, razor wire, armed guards, entrance tunnels and restrictive security protocols are now common. Moreover, reflecting how the perception of risk can override its actuality, such physical segregation is not confined to regions of marked insecurity. Helped by the centralizing effect of security policy, the standardization of field-security training, the demands of insurance companies and, not least, the anxieties of international aid workers themselves, over the past couple of decades the fortified aid compound has undergone a rhizomatous expansion. Insensitive to local security conditions, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is now the signature architecture of post-Cold War liberal interventionism.[1] As such, it is also embodies the latter's political and cultural malaise.

The end of the Cold War has radically reworked the risk environment in which aid agencies operate. In explaining the trend toward 'bunkerization', however, aid agencies tend to regard it as an unavoidable response to an exogenous decline in global security. What is seen as a *shrinking of humanitarian space* is thus due to 'an increasingly hostile and difficult operating environment, in which direct security threats are growing and the ability of humanitarians to act is becoming more constrained' (Collinson and Elhawary, 2012: 5). Claims like '[aid] workers are now more at risk than ever before'[2] or that 'the security situation for aid and overseas workers is getting steadily worse'[3] are commonplace and elicit little agency comment. Where attempts have been made to qualify views of an apparently spontaneous deterioration in external security, they have included references either to the *politicization of aid* or, more recently, to arguments concerning a *crisis of consent.* In proposing a more systemic and fabricated view of the current risk terrain, this article questions both perspectives.

The politicization argument holds that the appropriation of international aid as a tool of Western foreign policy, especially since 9/11, has by association increased the dangers faced by aid workers. While the empirical evidence for this in terms of aid-directed violence is tenuous (Fast, 2010), the objection here is that such a claim *exceptionalizes* the fundamental identity between aid and politics – in this case, restricting it in both *space* and *time*. Politicized aid is thus geographically confined to theatres of military intervention or open insurgency (BOND, 2003; Fox, 1999; Oxfam,

2011). By restricting political aid to war zones, the 'politicization' argument obscures its centrality to the spatially much wider liberal will to *transform whole societies.* Moreover, in recalibrating 9/11 as year zero for political aid (Christian Aid, 2004), the politicization argument conveniently occludes the extensive support among NGOs during the 1990s for more robust and direct Western political engagement in the disaster zones of the global south (Eriksson, 1996; International Development Committee, 1999). In responding to the decline in security, the more recent *crisis of consent* argument holds that the aid industry has revealed 'certain weaknesses . . . or what some have called "self-generated risks"' (Egeland et al., 2011: 9). Rather than the politicization of aid *per se*, these weaknesses are more concerned with the culture of Western aid, the lifestyles of international aid workers, the inequalities between international and national staff, failures to assert organizational independence, the competitive contract culture, aid's corrupting effects and the endemic distrust between aid agencies (Fast, 2007; Van Brabant, 2010). Among host populations, such negative cultural and organizational factors 'contribute to greater suspicion, less general "acceptance" and, unfortunately, outright hostility' (Van Brabant, 2010: 10)

To be sure, both the politicization and the crisis of consent arguments contain important truths about the aid encounter. Being part of the self-referential policy world, however, these truths are largely seen as technical problems amenable to policy change. While sounding a critical note, they also tend to *normalize* the present situation. Regarding politicization, attention has focused on maintaining NGO presence by clearly separating organizational identity from that of the military (Zandee, 1998). For the crisis of consent, overcoming negative perceptions by developing acceptance strategies with local communities has been emphasized (Egeland et al., 2011). Not only do such policy recommendations overlap and complement each other, the underlying message is that, despite a widespread perception of increased danger, aid agencies are nonetheless *determined to stay.* This article takes that very willingness to stay, and with it the tacit acceptance of perceived threats, as its point of departure. At the same time, given the actuality of aid bunkerization and aid-worker anxiety, it grounds itself in the deepening paradox that this determination reveals: the apparent expansion of the aid industry has witnessed a simultaneous social, intellectual and emotional withdrawal – a growing *remoteness* – of international aid workers from the societies in which they work.

The perception of heightened danger means that an increasingly segregated aid environment has been embraced more than it has been imposed. Its emergence has been coterminous with a profound shift in the way risk is understood and approached. Rather than a modernist 'freedom from' approach to contingency, risk is now accepted as inevitable – indeed, even celebrated as an opportunity to develop foresight, enterprise and responsibility (O'Malley, 2009). In the embrace of contingency as a 'freedom to' opportunity, protective measures have been eroded in favour of postmodernist technologies of *resilience.* As a way of encouraging enterprise, the perceived dangers of aid work, for example, could be argued to provide opportunities for aid agencies and aid workers to reinvent themselves anew. However, cutting across such neoliberal invocations to embrace risk, the growth of aid-related field security and 'care of the self' training suggests the emergence of countervailing modes of governance within late liberalism that attempt to govern security through insecurity, that is, by using anxiety to create responsibilized subjects (see Lentzos and Rose, 2009). Seen from this perspective, the fortified aid compound, besides being a defensive architecture, also takes on a therapeutic function. It provides the cultural and emotional life-support systems that anxious aid workers now require. Rather than embracing the world and its problems, governing through anxiety reinforces a growing remoteness (Watkins, 2012). Despite calls to embrace risk, the fortified aid compound offers an essential refuge from environments that

aid workers can no longer read or feel safe in. This article provides a preliminary sketch of some of the conceptual and empirical aspects of this portentous transition.

From protection to resilience

The perception of an increasingly hostile operational environment is not confined to aid agencies working in the global south. It resonates with government views of what *national security* now means for liberal states. In comparison with the supposed predictability of superpower rivalry during the Cold War, security experts now tell us that the world is more unknown and volatile (Rasmussen, 2001). National security has been refashioned around the principle of radical *uncertainty* (Cabinet Office, 2008; Department of Homeland Security, 2005). Building on complexity and network theory, national security imagines its exogenous risk environment as a potentially borderless social-ecological terrain shaped by the emergent properties of radically interconnected contingent events. As Michael Dillon (2007: 46) has argued, 'the contingent has now become the primary strategic principle of formation for the generic security of life which liberal governmental rule now purses globally'. Security occupies a networked terrain of feedback loops and multiplier effects that are made dangerous by the immanent possibility of synchronous failure (Pelosky, 2002). It occupies a magical space of flows where butterflies can flap their wings in Australia and cause hurricanes in America.

Such radical interconnectedness allows us to imagine, for example, how a drought in Africa, or a similar zone of imagined indwelling social-ecological breakdown, might increase rural poverty and augment environmental stress. In turn, the resulting scarcity exacerbates local conflict and further entrenches poverty (Collier et al., 2003; International Development Committee, 1999). Poverty, scarcity and conflict are also drivers of population displacement, refugee flows, international shadow economies and even terrorism, all of which threaten international security (World Bank, 2011). Our current understanding of dangerous climate change merges effortlessly with this global security imaginary (Busby, 2007). Climate change has become a force multiplier for all the various social, economic and political factors that exacerbate poverty and thus, through the radical interconnectivity of contingent events, global insecurity (Mitchell and Van Aalst, 2008; Oxfam, 2009). This complexity-based view of the coming age of catastrophe has, in turn, been seamlessly absorbed across the socio-economic and environmental policy spectrum (World Economic Forum, 2010). Not only does it shape national security, it also informs donor governments' humanitarian and development thinking (UNDP, 2004). A recent review of the UK Department for International Development's humanitarian assistance, for example, has predicted that more people in the underdeveloped world 'will be affected by humanitarian emergencies in the coming decades. Not only will they become more frequent, they will also be increasingly unpredictable and complex' (Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, 2011: 9). Indeed, such vulnerability defines what *underdevelopment* has become in the post-Cold War era.

While complexity thinking is the new conventional wisdom, as recently as the 1970s such views would have appeared fanciful to the disaster experts of the day. The dominant approach to disaster was then shaped by modernist assumptions and concerns. Emergencies were not regarded, as now, as being integral to the human–environment relationship. They were unscheduled events, discrete accidents or unusual occurrences lying outside of society that 'destabilise or *violate* ordinary life and relations to the habitat' (Hewitt, 1983: 6, emphasis in original). The aim of emergency response was to place some form of protective barrier or quarantine between the site of the disaster, its victims and normal society. In his important critique from 1983, Kenneth Hewitt argues that the

modernist approach to emergency had three interconnected components or belief systems: first, that geophysical processes, and their human impacts, could be predicted; second, that one could plan comprehensively and respond managerially to either contain such processes or, where impossible, relocate the human activities or populations concerned; and finally, including the logistical capacities of military and quasi-military forces, that one could create a centralized emergency response capacity based on a hierarchy of relief organizations. Modernist responses to emergency situations typically involved things like flood-control works, cloud seeding, urban zoning, building-code enforcement, avalanche defence, sealing off affected areas, refugee camps or civil-defence-style relocations of threatened populations.

As Hewitt argues, such acts of separation and quarantine tended to reinforce the *otherness* of emergency. Rather than radically interconnected events, disasters were more or less random and isolated misfortunes. An important consequence of this walling-off of disaster was that modernism found it difficult to contemplate human activity itself as creating emergency conditions. Actions that invited catastrophe could arise only by accident, negligence or deliberate sabotage. To argue that 'government, business, science or other institutions create disaster has been outlawed from rational discourse' (Hewitt, 1983: 17). Such possibilities could exist only as so-called conspiracy theories. Emergency was not, *as it has once more become*, a moral judgement on human actions: it was more an *unplanned side-effect.* Rather than being drivers of catastrophe, things like poverty, scarcity and conflict, for example, were the unfinished business of progress.

To be sure, uncertainty occupies a central place in both modernist and postmodernist conceptions of disaster. Importantly, however, each accords it a *different* significance. For modernism, it was the inexact and incomplete knowledge of when, where and upon whom emergency might fall that provided 'scientific credibility for the treatment of natural disasters as "accidents"' (Hewitt, 1983: 20). However, despite the best of efforts, the accurate prediction of disasters has remained, in large measure, uncertain. Continuing uncertainty is essential to the postmodernist critique. Rather than justifying the walling-off of emergency, today's conventional wisdom pulls in the opposite direction. As Pat O'Malley has argued, however, this is not simply a conceptual difference; it reflects a longstanding *political* struggle between two rationalities of security. Modernist society was to be managed through scientific knowledge operating according to quasi-natural laws revealed in probability and risk. In opposition, a countervailing *neoliberal* rationality exists where 'security and freedom are founded (and morally founded) in techniques of individual foresight and agency' (O'Malley, 2009: 33). The neoliberal counter-revolution broke out on multiple fronts during the 1970s. For this liberal imaginary, 'freedom was registered precisely by the uncertainty of the future, a future that could not be predicted accurately if indeed subjects were (liberally) free to invent it anew' (O'Malley, 2009: 33). From this perspective, the challenge of radical interconnectivity is not to protect against it, especially since it cannot be wholly predicted, but to consciously embrace the reality of its immanence (Peters, 1987). Instead of fearing disasters *per se*, we are urged to learn the new life-skills of preparedness and resilience and so exploit the emergent opportunities that disorder invariably creates (Bahadur et al., 2010; Folke, 2006).[4]

While resilience thinking and neoliberalism are different, they are intertwined in terms of their emergence (O'Malley, 2009; Walker and Cooper, 2011). Since the 1990s, resilience has quickly become an expansive *lingua franca* of preparedness, adaptation and survivability. Distinguished by its effortless ability to move across the natural, social and psychological sciences, it is multidisciplinary in a radical sense of the term, while also enjoying epic scalability. It can be invoked at the level of organisms and individual psychology, is found in natural habitats and social institutions, and forms a vital property of the built environment. One can use the same conceptual

framework to talk, for example, about the resilience of freshwater aquatic systems (Holling, 1973), how cities maintain or lose essential functions (Coaffee and Wood, 2006) or, for that matter, how aid workers cope with stress (Blanchetiere, 2006; Comoretto et al., 2011). If emergency, through the interconnectivity it reveals, constitutes a new ontology of life, then resilience has become a monotonous characteristic of *everything*. Commonly understood as the capacity to absorb shocks and bounce back, resilience is also the important ability to move between different states of temporary equilibrium, like those characterizing periods of prolonged disturbance and crisis, while at the same time maintaining system functionality (Folke, 2006). Indeed, the acolytes of resilience would go further. It is not simply a question of bouncing back; in embracing uncertainty as opportunity, the aim is to *bounce back better* (DFID, 2011: 9). Disaster – or, at least, the possibilities that its immanence creates – is now the *new* development (Bahadur et al., 2010; Schipper and Pelling, 2006; UNDP, 2004).

As a condition of its possibility, this new development depends upon its client communities and populations being free of modernist technologies of certainty and autonomy. To have a chance of working, communities have to be exposed, opened up or, in some way, *abandoned* to the possibility of risk and uncertainty. Only then is there a real opportunity that foresight, enterprise and responsibility can take root.

Compared to modernist forms of protection, such processes of 'freeing up' suggest the emergence of a new biopolitics. While resilience has strengthened its hold in the present climate of austerity and neoliberal consolidation, since the 1970s, in order to create this possibility, a biopolitical opening up has been taking place on numerous levels and sites across the development–underdevelopment divide. Some of this neoliberal stripping away has been imposed, especially in the economic and social welfare fields. Other aspects have been embraced in the name of freedom itself, particularly with regard to consumption, debt and self-identity. In this multileveled, wide-ranging and ambiguous process, modernist technologies of society-wide protection, regulation and social insurance have been progressively exchanged for more self-oriented skills of self-management, preparedness and resilience (Dean, 1999; Rose, 2000). Before I critically revisit the perception that aid work has become more dangerous, the postmodern reinterpretation of disaster will be examined as an example of this broad shift.

Internalizing emergency

This section provides a genealogical sketch of the transition from the modernist view of disaster as something external to society to seeing it as intrinsic to the internal functioning of society itself, and thus requiring urgent governance. By the end of the Cold War, the disaster zone had been reworked as a morally conflicted space of predatory winners and hapless losers. Working through such categories, the internalization of emergency provided a powerful moral justification for liberal interventionism and the post-Cold War expansion of the aid industry into challenging environments. It rationalized aid workers own 'freeing up' or exposure to new risk environments and the willingness of many to embrace this opportunity.

Modernism banished God from disasters; rather than a divine punishment for human failings, they were reworked as accidents or unusual occurrences. The postmodernist turn, however, has brought an eschatology of human folly back into the equation (Duffield and Evans, 2011). Since the 1970s, the modernist conception of disasters as more or less random events outside of normal society has been progressively abandoned. Emergency has been internalized and normalized as integral to the functioning of society. Human agency and choice have once again become important

– hence the need to govern their outcomes. While the present climate-change debate epitomizes this shift (Grove, 2010), earlier changes in the interpretation of famine anticipate this move. During the 1970s, it was still common for policymakers to regard famine as resulting from absolute and externally induced food shortages. The work of Amartya Sen (1981) has been influential in shifting our understanding of famine from outside to inside society. Rather than absolute shortages, famine now resides in the unequal social capital and degrees of market exclusion that befall individuals and define their different abilities to access that food which is available in the marketplace. Rather than socio-economic reform and income redistribution, Sen's entitlement approach emphasizes 'individual inclusion and choice-making capacities' (Chandler, forthcoming).

The behaviour and choices made by famine victims, together with the social and educational assets they can call upon, have also become important for disaster management. Alex de Waal's (1989) influential study of the 1984–5 famine in Darfur, for example, revealed that humanitarian aid only supplied around 12% of the total food consumed. What the affected communities did for themselves, their *coping strategies*, was shown to be more important than the efforts of the international aid industry. These strategies ranged from gathering famine foods – that is, wild plants and roots not normally consumed – through livestock sales, to selective labour migration. This shift in focus from *lives* to *livelihoods* in relation to famine was part of a wider reorientation of development generally towards the centrality of the choices made by individuals (Chambers, 1987; Solesbury, 2003). Development became less about material advancement and, as reflected in the establishment of the UNDP's Human Development Index, more focused on creating supporting market environments and programmes to help poor people make the right choices (Booth, 1993). Since individuals can make the wrong choices, with the postmodernist turn moral judgement now infuses relief and development.

The ability to make bad choices, however, is not confined to famine victims. By the end of the 1980s, it had been recognized that market failure and lack of social capital did not exhaust possibilities. Famines could also be deliberately created (De Waal, 1990). In Sudan, for example, it was discovered that famines had winners and losers, and that the former were capable of maintaining famine conditions, if not creating them. David Keen's (1994) important study of famine in south-western Sudan during the 1980s, for example, showed how local elites, who benefitted from the asset sales and cheap labour of famine victims, worked to sustain famine conditions. Thus, while famine victims could make good choices regarding how to cope, disaster zones were also home to predators who, on the basis of conscious economic and political calculation, could both gain from famine and, indeed, use it as a weapon of war (Duffield, 1991). By the end of the 1980s, in Africa at least, emergency had been internalized within the socio-economic fabric of society and the disaster zone reworked as a complex and conflicted moral terrain of winners and losers (Duffield, 1993).

Helped by Band Aid and the public anger regarding international inaction over the mid-1980s famine in Ethiopia, by the closing years of the Cold War the internalization of emergency and revelation of predatory human agency had created a powerful moral incentive for humanitarian intervention in the internal wars of the global south. In opposition to modernist conservatism, aid agencies were widely encouraged to put the saving of life 'above any political consideration or bureaucratic constraint' (Duffield, 2001: xx). However, while widely supported, the subsequent post-1989 surge in liberal interventionism effectively downgraded erstwhile third-world sovereignty over a wider front (Tamás, 2000). At the same time, oppositional groups that had been courted as liberation movements during the period of superpower rivalry quickly lost political legitimacy with its passing (Anderson, 1996). Within the New World Order, save that sanctioned by the UN or leading liberal states, political violence was no longer acceptable. Changing attitudes

to sovereignty, international law and political violence created the terrain for a marked expansion of the aid industry. As Antonio Donini (1996: 6) remarked, 'recent years have witnessed a kind of double lifting of inhibitions that had been largely suppressed by the Cold War's rules of the game: the inhibition to wage war and the inhibition to intervene'. At the same time, however, the dissolving of modernist constraints was coterminous with the normalization of working in ongoing conflict and chronic insecurity. The post-Cold War era would expose aid workers to a new systemic risk terrain, the implications of which are still unfolding.

Reflecting the postmodernist turn, the idea of a *complex emergency* first entered UN usage towards the end of the 1980s in Mozambique (Duffield, 1994: 9). In 1989 it was extended to South Sudan and, following the first Gulf War and the creation of the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs in 1992, subsequently gained wider circulation. While lacking an agreed definition, a complex emergency is usually regarded as a chronic, multicausal humanitarian crisis involving varying combinations of political, economic, environmental, conflict and peacekeeping factors (United Nations, 1994: 23). As such, complex emergencies require a system-wide response on the part of the aid industry. However, as Hugo Slim has pointed out, 'complexity' in this case does not refer to any new misery inflicted on their victims. The strategies involved were essentially the same as those that had killed millions during the civil wars of the 20th century. Complexity 'refers to an increase in the difficulties experienced by outsiders in the international community who seek to respond to such wars as essentially non-combatant, humanitarian and peace-promoting third parties' (Slim, quoted in Collinson and Elhawary, 2012: 11). As a logistical metaphor, a complex emergency speaks to the difficulty of coordinating system-wide aid responses in the new threat environment produced by the demise of modernist institutions and restraints. As a constantly updated and 'improved' logistical diagram, the complex emergency has undergone a continuous process of change and adaptation, from negotiated access to stabilization, through to the War on Terror and the advent of drone warfare. Against this backdrop of organizational change, the increasing bunkerization of the aid industry has been a constant feature.

The politics of exposure

The tendency towards institutional fragmentation, the erosion of protection and the opening up of aid workers to increased risk can be illustrated in relation to the changing context and meaning of humanitarian *negotiated access*. Over the space of two decades, negotiated access has shifted from a collective institutional framework for humanitarian access, formally backed by Western aid diplomacy and centred on UN neutrality, to a range of informal and individualized agency arrangements in more politically fragmented environments. Until at least the mid-1990s, negotiated access, as then practised in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Angola and the former Yugoslavia, had a collective UN-system-wide meaning. Often backed by written agreements, a UN lead agency would negotiate with both state and non-state warring parties to agree a programme of humanitarian access to affected populations (Duffield, 2007: 75–81). While the inclusion of non-state actors reflected the downgrading of sovereignty, this was seen by many as a humanitarian advance. For NGOs to become party to such arrangements and thus access UN logistics, the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the lead agency was common. These MoUs, together with the appearance of Ground Rules in some places, set out to codify the duties and responsibilities linking the UN, NGOs and warring parties. Typically, these agreements secured humanitarian access through promises of transparent and impartial humanitarian assistance by the aid agencies, in exchange for respect and protection from the warring parties (Levine, 1997).

While, in practice, negotiated access was fraught with difficulties – not least, the fragile nature of consent – there was nevertheless a formal system-wide approach to access that enjoyed the wide political backing of donor governments. Indeed, this backing was important in securing the agreement of warring parties. By the end of the 1990s, however, beginning with NATO's assertiveness in Bosnia and then Kosovo, the humanitarian phase of liberal interventionism was already giving way to the UN integrated mission and the attempt to integrate aid and politics in pursuit of Western foreign policy goals (Eide et al., 2005). It was the War on Terror, however, that effectively destroyed the basis of the earlier system-wide approach to humanitarian access. Virtually overnight, many non-state warring parties and opposition groups were unilaterally transformed into proscribed 'terrorists' under US pressure. Backed by a new raft of national security legislation promulgated by eager authoritarian states, many NGOs had to sever relations with existing partners and contract groups under threat of sanctions (Christian Aid, 2004). The New World Order had tightened its screws: the time for allowing aid agencies to formally negotiate with non-state actors was over. One consequence has been the running down and disbanding of the resources and expertise that the UN had developed to negotiate access and monitor compliance.

While the foregrounding of the security state within the development–security nexus preceded 9/11 (World Bank, 1997), its return has been matched by the inability or unwillingness of donor governments to press humanitarian issues in the global south (Keen, 2009; World Food Programme, 2009). Indeed, in comparison with the 1990s, there is a sense that Western governments have lost political influence (Magone et al., 2011). Thus, while humanitarian space is commonly seen as shrinking, part of the problem is that 'neither governments, parties to armed conflicts nor other influential actors are doing enough to come to its relief' (Egeland et al., 2011: iii). At the same time, the privileging of the security state has 'exacerbated the weak capacity and willingness of humanitarians to advocate and negotiate with host governments, donor governments, and non-state actors' (Egeland et al., 2011: xii). In comparison with the 1990s, the meaning of negotiated access has been fragmented and localized; it is now whatever deal an individual agency can strike with the actors and local strongmen it encounters. Aid agencies, particularly NGOs, now confront a situation in which 'those who control territory, funding or simply the closest guns are too often allowed to harass, politicize, militarize and undermine humanitarian action with impunity' (Egeland et al., 2011: iii). Security now has to be sought without reference to the legal instruments or political institutions of the state or, in relation to the UN, its international surrogate. Ground Rules, for example, which set out the working relations between aid agencies and warring parties, have been reduced in many locations to constantly changing systems of Red Lines that seek to limit harassment, extortion and informal taxation by local actors (Egeland et al., 2011: 17–18). The growth of uncertainty following the dismantling of system-wide attempts to negotiate humanitarian access is driving experimentation with techniques of remote management, new forms of subcontracting and the employment of private security (Cockayne, 2006; Rogers, 2006; Steets et al., 2012). As part of the trend toward bunkerization, the mental and emotional distance between international aid workers and beneficiaries is growing.

A growing remoteness

Despite the widespread perception that aid work has become more dangerous, the aid industry has continued to expand in challenging environments and shows every determination to stay. During the 1990s, when the Taliban held power in Afghanistan, the UN mission would withdraw on the slightest provocation, including the throwing of a coffee pot at a UN official (Donini, 2009: 8n14). Today,

even the deaths of aid workers are met with a defiant resolve to stick it out (BBC, 2011). This determination no doubt reflects the UN's stabilization and reconstruction role in support of Western foreign policy. The UN is now an aligned force, if not a warring party, directly supporting partisan political elites and committed to achieving defined international security outcomes (OECD-DAC, 2003; Eide et al., 2005; Sida, 2005). Moreover, the UN tends to set the bar for other agencies: if the UN is staying, so too are the many international NGOs, private companies and consultants that subcontract for it. Fragile states and contested sovereignties – that is, those challenging environments deemed important for Western security and where system-wide aid operations geographically concentrate – also delineate the aid economy's most profitable areas. Integrated missions are where the contract culture is most active. While aid agencies like to see their presence as a reflection of organizational criticality, it is also true that, in order to maintain market share, they have little choice but to follow the money. For international NGOs, especially, not having a visible presence in today's challenging environments threatens brand loyalty, weakens financial sustainability and brings into question an agency's capacity for humanitarian rescue (Van Brabant, 2010: 10).

However one seeks to explain the decision to stay, it reflects important changes in how risk is rationalized and managed. The growing normalization of danger, as reflected in the UN Afghanistan example, has initiated the questioning of the modernist safety-first approach that has shaped the expansion of the aid industry's present hierarchical security apparatus (Steets et al., 2012). In its place, more resilience-oriented technologies are being explored. An example is the *stay and deliver* programme (Egeland et al., 2011) that is haltingly being rolled out within the UN system. Launched in April 2011, it urges the adoption of 'an approach that focuses on "how to stay" as opposed to "when to leave"' (Egeland et al., 2011: x). In the shift from risk-aversion to a more resilient risk-accepting posture, the aim 'is not to avoid risk, but to manage risk in a way that allows [aid agencies] to remain present and effective in their work'. Building on earlier initiatives, 'stay and deliver' questions the centralization of security policy and the utility of predefined risk thresholds or phases that automatically trigger distinct bureaucratic responses, from restricting staff movement through to programme closure and withdrawal. Encouraging aid-beneficiary resilience as a convenient all-in-one preparedness, recovery and development solution is now well established (Mitchell and Van Aalst, 2008; Schipper and Pelling, 2006). Given that the move has already occurred within the military and other emergency responders, 'stay and deliver' reflects the inevitable migration of resilience thinking from beneficiaries to aid workers (Blanchetiere, 2006; Comoretto et al., 2011). It embodies 'the culmination of the past decade's evolution in thinking and methodology for programming in insecure environments' (Egeland et al., 2011: x).

'Stay and deliver' problematizes the utility of increasing bunkerization and segregation of international aid workers. It holds that whether aid agencies meet their objectives 'depends on organizations and individuals accepting a certain amount of risk – the risk that inevitably remains after all reasonable mitigation measures have been carried out' (Egeland et al., 2011: x). In trying to develop a security policy in the absence of a protective state or its effective surrogate, 'stay and deliver' emphasizes the development of community-level acceptance strategies and more collective forms of engaging local armed groups. However, given that there are important contractual and insurance factors, together with the anxieties of aid workers themselves, pulling against an increase in the direct exposure of international staff, it is debatable whether such measures will significantly alter the trend toward bunkerization (Van Brabant, 2010). One significant countervailing force is the effect of field-security training. Writing on the potential for using anxiety as a way of governing 'late-liberal' states, Filippa Lentzos and Nikolas Rose (2009) make a useful observation (see also Furedi, 2006). In attempting to govern without the modernist reference point of 'society',

late-liberalism has emphasized governance through the responsibilized choices of autonomous entities, be they organizations, families or individuals. At the same time, the radical uncertainty that now informs national security policy allows the governance of security *through* insecurity by 'intensifying subjective states of doubt, anxiety, apprehension and the like, with the aim of making individuals responsible for key aspects of security, that is to say, by ensuring the vigilance, preparedness and pre-emption required to secure security' (Lentzos and Rose, 2009: 235).

Within the aid industry, field-security training, which has grown considerably since the 1990s, especially among international agencies and staff, is a good example of the fabrication of anxiety as a tool of governance. At the same time, it suggests that the fortified aid compound is more than an unfortunate, and by implication temporary, defensive response to a decline in external security. The bunker is revealed as having important therapeutic and recuperative functions. A striking feature of field-security training is its formulaic and generic qualities (Duffield, 2010). While format and duration can differ, from in-house briefings to elaborate bespoke enactments, ideologically it is a 'one size fits all' approach that reinforces the view of a general decline in external security. Since it seeks to shape defensive behaviour, field-security training leaves little room for ambiguity regarding the outside world. Its messages are clear, simple and repetitive: *Aid work has changed, neutrality is no longer respected, and aid workers are now the deliberate targets of unseen assailants that can strike anywhere and anytime* (UNBSF, 2003). Whereas in the past, the threat of disease was the main vector of risk for aid workers (Fast, 2010: 373), today threats present themselves as an insurgent nightmare where nothing is as it seems, and where everyone is a potential enemy. For managing such a total threat environment, constant vigilance and risk-minimization are important. Field-security training emphasizes things like knowing how to read the road, watching movements in the neighbourhood, always looking for anomalies – always being prepared (UNASF, 2006). If you are travelling in a car and see what looks like a road accident, do not stop – think car-jack. Field-security training transforms the external world into an endlessly shifting and unreadable threat environment that demands constant vigilance.

Managing constant external uncertainty, however, is dependent upon proper care of the self: you cannot have one without the other. If field-security training fabricates anxiety through the simulation of *what could happen*, then resilience training develops therapeutic 'care of the self' techniques to manage these induced fears. Following its introduction to the military and emergency services (O'Malley, 2010), resilience training is now an expanding area of expertise within the aid industry (Blanchetiere, 2006; Comoretto et al., 2011). As with the promise of resilience more generally, accepting contingency, *even if the anxiety is only simulated*, offers the aid industry and aid workers an opportunity for reinvention and rejuvenation (International Alert, 2012). Resilience embodies the neo-Darwinian promise that if organizations and individuals can rise to the challenge of permanent threat, if they are not fazed by external dystopia, they can reinvent themselves anew as more flexible and more adaptive, becoming altogether better and more agile models of their old selves. Strengthening personal resilience through training reflects a move away from trying to cure post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Howell, forthcoming): the intention is to prevent it from happening in the first place. Learning to be resilient has been likened to putting on 'mental armour' or, alternatively, learning to help the body's natural stress-management mechanisms.[5] Resilience training is similar to that for field security in that, while format and duration can vary, it has a number of generic features. These include an emphasis on healthy living, learning how to recognize the symptoms of stress in oneself, the need for a supportive social network, how to avoid negative thought patterns, the importance of spirituality and techniques of emotional distancing, and being aware of stress in others.

Resilience training has created a new commonsense of how to deal with stressful situations. It differs from the modernist commonsense that had its origins in 19th-century liberalism and was known as 'fortitude' (O'Malley, 2010). As a measure of moral strength and courage, fortitude is a character trait that not all people have. While you can select for it through interviews and exercises, unless the foundations of fortitude are already indwelling within the individual, you cannot necessarily create it. Fortitude formed the military's commonsense approach to battle stress for most of the 20th century (O'Malley, 2010). At the same time, it guided selection for colonial service (Kirke-Green, 2000) and, importantly, it also underpinned the voluntary ethos that, until the 1970s at least, defined NGO subjectivity (Jones, 1965). Unlike fortitude, resilience is not a natural or fixed character trait. It is a technology of the self that can be both learnt and taught. With proper training and a will to learn, *anyone can become resilient*. As the contrast between fortitude and resilience suggests, the contemporary aid worker's mode of self-awareness and way of understanding the world is different from those of colonial subjectivity or, indeed, NGO voluntarism. The colonial political officer knew the world through the gendered sense-certainty of race and class. This interior world was strengthened through the cultural immersion made possible by the mastery of native languages and, often at first hand, ethnographic study (Johnson, 2011). NGO voluntarism was also valued as a technology of *proximity*, in relation both to the material self-denial of the volunteer and to his/her lived relationship with the poor (Jones, 1965). For today's international aid worker, however, inducing anxiety through the simulation of danger, together with privileging narcissistic care of the self responses, acts to separate and increase the *remoteness* of the aid worker from the world. If modernism tried to physically separate disaster from society, the postmodernist turn, while internalizing emergency within society, is physically and mentally walling off the aid worker.

Other than reproducing the imaginary of underdevelopment as dangerous, security and resilience training tell us little about the external world. That is not to say, however, that as a portable set of induced fears, risk-management skills and care of the self techniques, such training is not well adapted to life in the aid archipelago. It functions well in an international aid milieu that is both bunkered and constantly churning. Such training doubles as essential knowledge in a world where contracts are often measured in months rather than years, and the average aid worker has no knowledge of the history, politics or languages of the countries they temporarily work in. Indeed, security- and resilience-thinking not only replace the need for local knowledge, but also help to construct the parallel world that exists within the fortified aid compound. A paradox of the expansion of the aid industry within challenging environments is that it has been accompanied by a growing subjective separation between international staff and the societies within which they circulate. Despite its protection – indeed, because of it – the cultural world within the aid archipelago is a paranoid, alienated and stressful one (Watkins, 2012). As a graphic expression of the malaise of liberal interventionism, the negative effects of the aid archipelago are questioned by many who work within it. At the same time, however, it provides essential support for the anxious subjectivity of the aid worker. The fortified aid compound is more than an unfortunate but necessary defensive measure. It is a therapeutic infrastructure allowing for care of the self and a necessary refuge from a threatening world that aid workers no longer understand or feel safe in. As such, it signals a deepening malaise within the liberal project.

Funding

The background research on which this article is based has been conducted under the auspices of an ESRC -DFID research grant (RES-167-25-0439) entitled `Achieving Policy Coherence in Challenging Environments: Risk Management and Aid Culture in Sudan and Afghanistan'.

Notes

1 Over the past several years, the author has made over a dozen conference and workshop presentations across Europe and in Canada that have featured the fortified aid compound. Audience feedback, together with correspondence with several security officers, has confirmed its widespread propagation.
2. See the RedR website at http://www.redr.org.uk/en/other/document_summary.cfm/docid/5D18BB83-8E80-4938-82440128CA952C90 (accessed 26 April 2012).
3 See the Humanitrain webiste at http://www.humanitrain.com (accessed 26 April 2012).
4 For a less sanguine view, see Klein (2007).
5 See the websites for Integration Training's Achilles Initiative at http://integrationtraining.co.uk/achilles.html (accessed 8 July 2012); People in Aid at http://www.humanitarianforumindonesia.org/News/tabid/254/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/98/People-in-Aid-and-Headington-Invites-INGOs-and-NGOs-to-Join-On-Two-Days-Building-Resilience-Training.aspx (accessed 8 July 2012); and similar courses at RedR at http://www.redr.org.uk/en/Training/find-a-training-course.cfm/url/SSRSEPT12 (accessed 17 July 2012).

References

Anderson MB (1996) *Do No Harm: Supporting Local Capacities for Peace Through Aid.* Cambridge, MA: Local Capacities for Peace Project, Collaborative for Development Action.

Bahadur AV, Ibrahim M and Tanner T (2010) The resilience renaissance? Unpacking of resilience for tackling climate change and disasters. Strengthening Climate Resilience Discussion Paper 1. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Baitenmann H (1990) NGOs and the Afghan war: The politicisation of aid. *Third World Quarterly* 12(1): 62–86.

BBC (2011) Afghanistan: Obama condemns killings of UN staff. *News South Asia,* 3 April. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12949302 (accessed 2 November 2011).

Berman M ([1982] 2010) *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. London & New York: Verso.

Blair T (1999) A new generation draws the line. *Newsweek* 133(16): 41.

Blanchetiere P (2006) Resilience of humanitarian workers. Condensed MSc dissertation. Institute of Development and Policy Management, University of Manchester.

Booth D (1993) Development research: From impasse to a new agenda. In: Schurman FJ (ed.) *Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory*. London: Zed, 49–76.

British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND) (2003) *Global Security and Development.* London: BOND.

Bruderlein C and Gassmann P (2006) Managing security risks in hazardous missions: The challenges of securing United Nations access to vulnerable groups. *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 19(Spring): 63–93.

Busby JW (2007) *Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Cabinet Office (2008) *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World*. London: Cabinet Office.

Chambers R (1987) Sustainable livilihoods, environment and development: Putting poor rural people first. IDS Discussion Paper 240. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

Chandler D (forthcoming) Where is the human in human-centred approaches to development? A biopolitical critique of Amartya Sen's 'development as freedom'. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*.

Christian Aid (2004) *The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War*. London: Christian Aid.

Coaffee J and Wood DM (2006) Security is coming home: Rethinking scale and constructing resilience in the global urban response to terrorist risk. *International Relations* 20(4) 503–517.

Cockayne J (2006) Commercial security in humanitarian and post-conflict settings: An exploratory study. New York: International Peace Academy.

Collier P, Elliott VL, Hegre H, Hoeffler A, Reynal-Querol M and Sambanis N (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* Washington, DC & Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Collinson S and Elhawary S (2012) Humanitarian space: A review of trends and issues. HPG Report 32. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Insitute.

Comoretto A, Crichton N and Albery I (2011) *Resilience in Humanitarian Aid Workers: Understanding Processes of Development*. London: Lambert Academic.

De Waal A (1989) *Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984–85.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

De Waal A (1990) A re-assessment of entitlement theory in the light of recent famines in Africa. *Development and Change* 21(3): 469–490.

Dean M (1999) *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: Sage.

Department for International Development (DFID) (2011) Defining disaster resilience: A DFID approach paper. London: DFID.

Department of Homeland Security (2005) *National Preparedness Guidance*. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security.

Dillon M (2007) Governing through contingency: The security of biopolitical governance. *Political Geography* 26(1): 41–47.

Donini A (1996) *The Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afganistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda*. Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.

Donini A (2009) Afghanistan: Humanitarianism under threat. Boston, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

Douzinas C (2003) Humanity, military humanism and the new moral order. *Economy and Society* 32(2): 159–183.

Duffield M (1991) *War and Famine in Africa*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Duffield M (1993) NGOs, disaster relief and asset transfer in the Horn: Political survival in a permanent emergency. *Development and Change* 24(1): 131–157.

Duffield M (1994) Complex political emergencies: An exploratory report for UNICEF with reference to Angola and Bosnia. Birmingham: School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham.

Duffield M (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merger of Development and Security.* London: Zed.

Duffield M (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples.* Cambridge: Polity.

Duffield M (2010) The fortified aid compound: Linking aid architecture, risk managment and urban pathology. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 4(4): 453–474.

Duffield M and Evans B (2011) Biospheric security: The development–security–environment nexus (DESNEX), containment and retrenching Fortress Europe. In: Burgess JP and Gutwirth S (eds) *A Threat Against Europe? Security, Migration and Integration.* Brussels: Institute for European Studies, 93–110.

Duffield M and Prendergast J (1994) *Without Troops or Tanks: Humanitarian Intervention in Eritrea and Ethiopia.* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press/Red Sea Press.

Egeland J, Harmer A and Stoddard A (2011) *To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments*. New York: Policy Development and Studies Bureau, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Eide EB, Kaspersen AT, Kent R and Von Hippel K (2005) Report on integrated missions: Practical perspectives and recommendations. Independent study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group.

Eriksson J (1996) The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience – synthesis report. Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.

Fast L (2007) Characteristics, context and risk: NGO insecurity in conflict zones. *Disasters* 31(2): 130–154.

Fast L (2010) Mind the gap: Documenting and explaining violence against aid workers. *European Journal of International Relations* 16(3): 365–389.

Folke C (2006) Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analysis. *Global Environmental Change* 16(3): 253–267.

Fox F (1999) The politicisation of humanitarian aid: A discussion paper for Caritas Europa – November 1999. London: CAFOD.

Fukuyama F (2002) The end of history? In: O'Meara P, Mehlinger HD and Krain M (eds) *Globalization and the Challenges of a New Century.* Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 161–180.

Fukuyama F (2012) The future of history. *Foreign Policy* 91(1): 53–61.

Furedi F (2006) *The Culture of Fear.* London: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Graham S and Marvin S (2001) *Splintering Urbanism.* London: Routledge.

Grove KJ (2010) Insuring 'our common future?' Dangerous climate change and the biopolitics of environmental security. *Geopolitics* 15(3): 536–563.

Hewitt K (1983) The idea of calamity in a technocratic age: In: Hewitt K (ed.) *Interprations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology*. Boston, MA, London & Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1–32.

Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics* 4: 1–23.

Howell A (forthcoming) The imminent demise of PTSD: From governing trauma to governance through resilience. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 36(2).

Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) *Humanitarian Emergency Response Review.* London: Department for International Development.

Ignatieff M (2003) *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*. London: Vintage.

International Alert (2012) Training on core skills for working in conflict. Available at: http://www.international-alert.org/news/training-core-skills-working-conflict (accessed 29 February 2012).

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) *The Responsibility To Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.* Ottawa: International Development Research Centre.

International Development Committee (1999) *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Volume I: Report and Proceeding to the Committee*. London: The Stationery Office.

Johnson DH (2011) Colonial ethnology in the Sudan Intelligence Reports and Sudan Notes and Records. In: Tilley HL and Gordon RJ (eds) *Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism and the Politics of Knowledge*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 415–450.

Jones M (1965) *Two Ears of Corn: Oxfam in Action*. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

Keen D (1994) *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983–1989*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keen D (2009) Compromise or capitulation? Report on WFP and the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka: Conference report and background paper June 2009. In: *Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies.* Rome: World Food Programme, 49–102.

Kirke-Green A (2000) *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966.* London: Palgrave.

Klein N (2007) *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism.* London: Penguin.

Lentzos F and Rose N (2009) Governing insecurity: Contingency planning, protection, resilience. *Economy and Society* 38(2): 230–254.

Levine I (ed.) (1997) Promoting humanitarian principles: The South Sudan experience. Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 21. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1–31.

Magone C, Weissman F and Neumann M (2011) *Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed: The MSF Experience.* London: Hurst.

Mitchell T and Van Aalst M (2008) Convergence of disaster risk reduction and climate change adapatation. Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/files/7853_ConvergenceofDRRandCCA1.pdf (accessed 15 May 2012).

OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) (2003) A development co-operation lens on terrorism prevention: Key entry points for action. Paris: OECD-DAC.

O'Malley P (2009) 'Uncertainty makes us free': Liberalism, risk and individual security. *Behemoth: A Journal on Civilisation* 2(3): 24–38.

O'Malley P (2010) Resilient subjects: Uncertainty, warfare and liberalism. *Economy and Society* 39(4): 488–509.

Oxfam (2009) *Suffering the Science: Climate Change, People and Poverty*. Oxford: Oxfam.

Oxfam (2011) *Whose Aid Is It Anyway?* Oxford: Oxfam.

Pelosky RJ (2002) *Synchronous Failure: The Real Danger of the 21st Century.*Washington, DC: The Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

Peters T (1987) *Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a Management Revolution*. New York: Knopf.

Rasmussen MV (2001) Reflexive security: NATO and international risk society. *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 30(2): 285–309.

Rogers C (2006) Accessing the inaccessible: The use of remote programming strategies in highly insecure countries to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance – Iraq: a case study. Dissertation for the degree of Master of Arts in Post-War Recovery Studies. York: Post-War Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU), University of York.

Rose N (2000) *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schipper L and Pelling M (2006) Disaster risk, climate change and international development: Scope for, and challenges to, integration. *Disasters* 30(1): 19–38.

Sen AK (1981) *Poverty and Famines.* Oxford: Clarendon.

Sida L (2005) Challenges to humanitarian space: A review of humanitarian issues related to the UN integrated mission in Liberia and to the relationship between humanitarian and military actors in Liberia. Monrovia: Monitoring and Steering Group (MSG) Liberia.

Slim H (1997) Doing the right thing: Relief agencies, moral dilemas and moral responsibility in political emergencies and war. Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief, Report no. 6. Uppsala: The Nordic Africa Institute.

Solesbury W (2003) Sustainable livelihoods: A case study of the evolution of DFID policy. Working Paper 217. London: Overseas Development Insitute.

Steets J, Reichhold U and Sagmeister E (2012) *Evaluation and Review of Humanitarian Access Strategies in DG ECHO Funded Interventions.* Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute.

Stiglitz JE (1998) Towards a new paradigm for development: Strategies, policies, and processes. 1998 Prebisch Lecture. Geneva: UNCTAD.

Stoddard A, Harmer A and Haver K (2006) Providing aid in insecure environments: Trends in policy and operations. London: Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute.

Tamás GM (2000) On post-fascism. *Boston Review* (Summer). Available at: http://bostonreview.net/BR25.3/tamas.html (accessed 20 February 2006).

UNASF (2006) *Advanced Security in the Field.* CD-ROM. United Nations.

UNBSF (2003) *Basic Security in the Field.* CD-ROM. United Nations.

United Nations (1994) Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations. New York: United Nations.

United Nations (2001) Safety and security of humanitarian personnel and protection of United Nations personnel. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2004) Reducing disaster risk: A challenge for development. New York: Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP.

Van Brabant K (2010) Managing aid agency security in an evolving world: The larger challenge. London: European Interagency Security Forum.

Walker and Cooper M (2011) Genealogies of resilience: From systems ecology to the political economy of crisis adaptation. *Security Dialogue* 42(2): 143–160.

Watkins T (2012) Rebuilding Haiti: Why is it taking so long? Available at: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/fear-and-loathing-in-port-au-prince (accessed 15 May 2012).

World Economic Forum (WEF) (2010) *Global Risks 2010: A Global Risk Network Report*. Geneva: WEF.

World Food Programme (WFP) (2009) *Humanitarian Assistance in Conflict and Complex Emergencies: Conference Report and Background Papers June 2009*. Rome: WFP.

World Bank (1997) *The State in a Changing World: The World Development Report 1997.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

World Bank (2011) *Conflict, Security and Development.* Washington, DC: World Bank.

Zandee D (ed.) (1998) *Building Blocks for Peace: Civil Military Interaction in Restoring Fractured Societies.* The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

Mark Duffield is Emeritus Professor at the Global Insecurities Centre, University of Bristol. Email: m.duffield@bristol.ac.uk. He is the author of *Development, Security and Unending War* (Polity, 2007) and *Global Governance and the New Wars* (Zed, 2001).