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Globalisation and Local Resistance: The Case of the Ogoni versus Shell

CYRIL I. OBI

Introduction

The extractive and pollutive activities of Shell, the Anglo-Dutch global oil giant which produces slightly over half of Nigeria's oil, have spawned alienation, protests and resistance across the local or host communities of the oil-rich Niger delta region in the past two decades. These took a turn for the worse from the mid-1980s in the wake of a deepening economic crisis, the throes of structural adjustment and a farcical political transition. The struggle of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was essentially driven by the quest for self-determination, to wrest their ecology from Shell and force the Nigerian state to accept their right to control their land and the proceeds therefrom.

To stem the further 'production of environmental degradation' and the expropriation of the oil-rich Ogoni ecology, MOSOP waged a popular-based campaign against Shell and the Nigerian state, both locally and globally. Thus, far from being irrelevant, the Nigerian state remains a significant factor in the local-global nexus. Rooted in imperialism, and entirely dependent on externally realised oil rents for its reproduction, this state, as an expression of a fragile yet strong power bloc seeking to impose its hegemony on the Nigerian 'nation', while guaranteeing the local conditions for unimpeded global accumulation in Nigeria, shows the penetrability of the local into the global. It reflects how the balance of social forces influences outcomes locally. The environment thus becomes a contested terrain reflecting social and political relations as expressions of power over production, distribution and access.

The dialectics of globalisation and local resistance

The politics of local resistance is a form of collective action directed at blocking further alienation, expropriation and environmental degradation, and forcing through a mass project of restitution and self-determination. By its very nature,

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local resistance is a social movement shaped and influenced by a host of historical, social and economic factors.

To grasp the dialectics of globalisation and local resistance within the context of the Ogoni struggle, it is apposite to situate our analysis in the structure of the ongoing project of globalisation. This is to avoid the limitations of state-centric approaches, and the tendency for mainstream international relations theory to address the politics of global environmental change inadequately.[1] In considering the global logic of capital and its connections with environmental degradation and local resistance, attention will be paid to the 'national' context of the struggle, the social and political forces locked in the conflict, and their position in the global accumulation of capital at the local level.

Globalisation, Shell and local resistance

Shell's interaction with the Ogoni environment is at the root of the conflict. The Ogoni, as the landowners, have over the years been increasingly alienated from the products of their land. In order to carry out its extractive role at the behest of global capital, Shell has expropriated peasant land, polluted the ecosystem and virtually destroyed the livelihood of the local Ogoni peasantry, without paying heed to initially peaceful demands for restitution. To get at the root of Ogoni resistance, one needs to 'focus on the underlying structural conditions that give rise to expropriation and environmental degradation at the local level',[2] and on their connection with global accumulation. Conceptually, one cannot separate the environmental crisis in Ogoni land from the process of globalisation. What then is Shell's role in the process of globalisation?

A lot has been written about the immense power, wealth and global spread of the seven leading oil multinationals.[3] The links between these global oil giants, which control oil interests in many countries scattered all over the world, and how they act in concert, have been well reported and need not be repeated here. What is important, however, is the strategic link between the oil giants and the energy needs of the industrial powers, particularly the G-7 countries. Oil plays a strategic role as the most viable source of energy for transforming nature into commodities, which are exchanged to realise surplus. Thus control of oil by these oil giants is directly linked to the reproduction and expansion of capital on a global scale.

Shell is located in 'a global structure of material accumulation which simultaneously concentrates wealth and energy both in certain locales and at certain social levels of extracting and dispossessing from other locales and social levels'.[4] Shell, as an energy monopolist controlling a commodity (oil) which powers global accumulation, is a critical actor in the separation of use value from exchange value. In the Ogoni context, within the logic of capital, Shell need not 'attend to either [local] labour needs or local ecological propriety'. As Saurin further argues:

> The destruction of Ogoni lands in Southern Nigeria by oil companies including allegedly Royal Dutch Shell satisfies the covetous and distanced shareholders who derive huge financial

> benefit from these lands and people. At the same time, the Ogoni pay the permanent costs of ecological degradation and repression, whilst relinquishing their control over what happens to their land, to the oil, or the product of their labour.[5]

It is the globally determined social relations of production, which alienate the Ogoni from the proceeds of oil production and define the contending forces in the politics of resistance. As observed by MOSOP, Ogoni indigenes were not employed by Shell; their locality lacks basic infrastructure; and pollution has destroyed the main elements of the local economy, namely farming, fishing, hunting and petty trading. What was at stake was the very existence of the Ogoni—the right to be, or the total surrender to the forces of global oil capital. It is this struggle for achieving re-control of the land, and to re-impose environmentally sustainable local economic practices that pitched the Ogoni against the further penetration of global capital. Having been marked out and given to Shell since 1938,[6] Ogoni land was integrated into 'globalized capitalist relations'.[7] It became part of Shell's global fief, with its oil wealth being the main attraction of the bargain. This process of integration into the global economy concentrated expropriation and wealth differentially at the local and global levels. Having established the connection between Shell and the global project of the expansion of capitalist accumulation, local resistance in Ogoni was therefore the dialectic outcome of the quest to block further expropriation and environmental degradation.

The Ogoni versus Shell: from the local to the global

The specificities of the Ogoni struggle for self-determination have been variously treated. Apart from the writings, interviews and speeches of its prominent spokesperson and leader of MOSOP, the late Ken Saro-Wiwa,[8] other writers have treated it in terms of a struggle against 'internal colonization',[9] ethnic minority elite agitation,[10] or the festering, unresolved minority nationality question in Nigeria's skewed federalism.[11] Welch presents the Ogoni struggle within the ambience of the risks involved in the quest for social justice and self-determination in sub-Saharan Africa.[12] A common thread linking these works is the state-centric and descriptive approach, which pays inadequate attention to the critical nexus between local resistance and the contradictions arising from the global social relations of production. The consequence is reductionist and managerial, focusing on the roots of 'ethnic conflict' in order to arrive at the proper management of such conflicts, and on the 'minority question' within the context of reforms of Nigeria's federalism. Steeped in positivist social science, this approach glosses over the economic and political impact of Shell's intervention in the Ogoni ecosystem, while treating the social forces in conflict as undifferentiated ethnic 'wholes' without considering the differences in their location on the 'basis of the power relations between dominant classes among interacting ethnic groups'.[13] This way the vital trans-class and inter-class coalitions which cut across ethnic and national lines, and the ways these reflect the balance of social forces and power, are entirely lost. The important question

is not the identification of the ethnic appearance of 'minority group resistance', but how the transnational ruling class coalition subverts the ranks of the social and political forces which resist global accumulation in their locality.

A new approach enables us to transcend the limited value of an analysis which queries the Ogoni struggle on the grounds that the latter were not the only marginalised ethnic minority group in Nigeria, or others that catalogue how the 'majority ethnic groups' controlled the oil wealth to the exclusion of the Ogoni. The truth is that the transnational ruling class, made up of factions of the dominant class at the global, national and local levels, benefits from the expropriation and degradation of the oil-rich Ogoni ecology. It is also necessary to examine the role of the state, and its structural inability to resist globalisation even where the imperatives of global accumulation demand the destruction of the ecosystem and the subversion of the rights of a people.

State and Shell in Nigeria: the unequal partnership

The state in Nigeria is the product of colonialism. Its early form was clearly the result of intervention, directed at the forceful integration of Nigeria into the global capitalist system: as a source of supply for cheap raw materials and a ready market for finished products from the global centres of industrial capital. The task of integration and the process of defining the territoriality of the colonial state involved the process of forcefully bringing together people of diverse nationalities and pre-capitalist modes of production.[14] As noted elsewhere, the centralised nature of colonial patrimonialism gave the factions of certain numerically superior ethnic groups a headstart in the sharing of spoils within the colonial state, which in turn gave them effective control over cash-crop based accumulation and a role in exercising power at the regional level.[15] The consequence of this was that the dominant factions found in ethnicity a ready tool for mobilisation for access to resources and power. In the equation of colonial patrimonialism and the game of numbers, the ethnic minorities often lost out, or were marginalised in the process of accumulation. Their response was one of using ethnicity to push for self-determination, usually expressed in the form of demands for exclusive space, state creation, which would give them room to exercise autonomy over resources, and protection from having these resources taken away by powerful factions from the majority ethnic groups.[16]

As far back as 1889, 1907 and 1914, the colonial state had legislated the monopoly of oil concessions in Nigeria to 'British or British-allied capital'.[17] Under the 1914 law, Shell (and later Shell-BP) was granted an oil exploration license in 1938 covering the entire mainland of Nigeria, an area of 367 000 square miles.[18] Shell's monopoly was exercised without local participation. It was exercised over 'Nigeria's' oil until 1959—one year before the latter's independence, when it reduced its acreage to 16 000 square miles. Between 1938 when it started operations, 1956 when it first struck oil in commercial quantity at Oloibiri, and the commencement of oil exports in 1958, Shell was able to establish control over the most promising oil acreages and reserves, and consolidated its headstart over the other oil majors, who arrived later on the local

scene, in 1959.[19] The implications of Shell's advantaged position, its global control of Nigeria's oil *vis-à-vis* the role of the state, and its impact on domestic accumulation and politics did not become obvious until the collapse of the cash-crop economic base in the mid-1960s.

Thus, from the 1970s onwards, oil became the fiscal basis of the Nigerian state, accounting for over 80 per cent of national revenue and 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.[20] As a result of the social relations spawned by global oil, Nigerians were excluded from production, while the local dominant class factions were engaged in a zero-sum contest for rentier niches at the level of the distribution of oil surplus, mediated by the state, which had formal authority over the collection (and allocation) of oil rents.[21]

It is important to note the shift by the state over the years from non-participation to participation in the oil industry; an action that cemented the ties between national and global capital. Thus from being content to be a mere collector of taxes or rents starting from the 1959 Petroleum Profits Tax, the state began to acquire participation rights in the operating companies mining oil in Nigeria. This also provided a legitimacy garb of economic nationalism for the state, and increased access to oil rents. The 1969 Decree No. 51, which abrogated the 1914 Petroleum Act, theoretically transferred the control of oil from the oil giants operating in Nigeria to the state. It also vested all oil revenues—on-shore and off-shore—in the state. The state also took up equity interest in the joint ventures it had with the oil companies. It initially took equity in Shell–Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) joint ventures to the tune of 60 per cent, then 80 per cent (with the nationalisation of BP assets in Nigeria) in 1979, and now it has about 55 per cent, with 10 per cent owned by Elf and five per cent by Agip, while Shell owns 30 per cent equity participation. Yet Shell remains Nigeria's largest operator, while the state's interest in oil surplus is mostly represented in its joint venture with Shell, and the latter's critical role in Nigeria's proposed Liquefied Natural Gas Project, expected to come on stream early in the 21st century. Thus the state and Shell have a common stake in the creation of oil surplus and global oil-based accumulation.[22] Shell derives 14 per cent of all its oil from Nigeria,[23] while the oil-dependent state in Nigeria relies on Shell to produce 51 per cent of 'its' oil. This way Shell's control of Nigeria's oil has continued to grease the wheels of global accumulation.

Because of the dependence of the Nigerian state on oil surplus, it is integrated into the global relations of production which expropriate the oil resources of its territory and people. Its role of mediation is not unilinear, but rather reflects the divisions within the ranks of the domestic ruling class and the balance of forces in society. Indeed, the ruling coalition has remained riven by 'regional political and ruling structures that have overlapped with historical patterns of economic and educational opportunity to create distinct regional fractions of the bourgeoisie that are hegemonic in their respective sectors'.[24] It is this ruling coalition and its global partners who have 'privatised' the state. At the local level, the oil minorities faction have found themselves playing a marginal role, often coopted by the dominant groups but left out of the 'commanding heights' of the power bloc. Therefore oil, being the key to Nigeria's participation in global accumula-

tion, is a contested terrain by all social groups, while the state as the sum total of relations arising from the global character of oil production is a site of constant struggles for access to power and primitive accumulation. The state's existence and that of the ruling coalition depends on the global oil giants, particularly Shell.

Apart from Shell's role in defining the parameters of Nigeria's oil for the global market, its status as a power house of global capital renders the state in Nigeria a weak partner. Giving a picture of Shell's might, Miller notes that:

> Shell Oil's 1990 gross national income was more than the combined GNPs of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Zaire, Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya and Pakistan—countries that represent almost one-tenth of the World's Population.[25]

Shell also runs fully integrated oil operations in over 100 countries across the world and has substantial interests in gas, chemicals, mining and real estate.[26] Its joint venture partner (and competitor), the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), is no match for Shell.

Thus Shell's position in Nigeria's political economy and its role as the cutting edge of the global control of Nigeria's oil offers its 'unequal' partner—the state—little autonomy *vis-à-vis* the imperatives of globalisation. The state in Nigeria in effect defends its partner from contending social and political forces, repressing and deconstructing all local opposition to Shell. By reinforcing its control over the political, the state protects global accumulation and the interests of the transnational coalition, while still projecting itself as the protector of national interest and security in order to retain its legitimacy. The objective role of the state and the interests of the ruling coalition perceive the Ogoni resistance as subversion, an act obstructive of the expansion of global oil capital in a period of crisis, and therefore needing to be crushed at all cost.

Ogoni versus global oil

The Ogoni struggle against Shell goes back to 1958. It had its background in the forceful integration of the Ogoni into the global oil economy. As oil capital penetrated deeper into the Ogoni ecosystem, it spawned a relations of production which alienated the landowners and producers from the products of their land, i.e. oil, which was taken out, while degrading the environment and destroying the basis of livelihood in the agro-based peasant economy. This led to the clash between Shell and the Ogoni people. Several developments acted as catalysts in the escalation of this clash: the Nigerian civil war, the impact of structural adjustment on social and power relations, and changes in global politics in the post-Cold-War era.

The Nigerian civil war led to some shifts in the balance of social and political forces in Nigeria. At the onset of the war, the four regions were split into 12 states, satisfying to some extent the age-old quest of ethnic minorities for self-determination. With respect to the ethnic minorities of the Niger delta, they soon found out that what they gained within the 12-state–federal structure was lost in terms of non-access to oil revenue. What this implied politically was that

the regionally defined factions of the dominant class, particularly those which had defeated Biafran claims to the oil fields of the Niger delta, were not in control of the distribution of oil-rents, while the oil minorities faction found itself marginalised. The new struggle was now defined both within the dominant class, into which oil minorities factions or actors were variously coopted or sacrificed, or between the dominant class and the oil minorities faction, in which the latter mobilised popular forces against the former on the grounds of 'the solidarity of the oppressed, the quest for justice and self-determination, and the need to resist further marginalization'. The response of the oil minorities faction immediately after the war was largely one of disappointment that its tactical support for the federalist dominant class did not translate into compensation in the form of access to oil surplus; rather it led to the blockage of access.[27] This led to debates within the oil minorities factions which were basically united by the quest for more access to oil surplus, increased autonomy and power at the local level, and restitution for ecological damage by oil companies. On the one hand were those who believed in limited protest, and full cooptation into the hegemonic agenda of the transnational ruling coalition, while the opposing faction believed in confronting the transnational coalition with evidence of its atrocities and using popular power to wrest restitution, increased autonomy and power at the local level.

Ogoni resistance can also be linked to the high concentration of global capital in their region. As Welch has put it:

> The Ogoni live atop some of the richest real estate in Africa yet few Ogoni benefit from jobs, developments or amenities in the oil industry. Instead, they suffer serious environmental degradation that has polluted streams and fresh water sources, poisoned land through spills and blowouts, and created an atmosphere fouled by decades of flaring natural gas.[28]

Within an area of 404 square miles, Ogoni is host to six oil fields with numerous overland pipes connecting various oil installations, two refineries, a huge fertiliser plant, petrochemical plants and an ocean port. Ogoni represents the paradox of capitalist accumulation—as the poorest and most industrialised enclave in Nigeria.[29] At the heart of this contradiction lie the roots of the Ogoni revolution. It pitched the global against the local, accumulation against resistance.

The immersion of Nigeria into economic crisis, and its adoption of a socially harsh programme of economic adjustment in the midst of a constrained programme of political transition, sharpened these contradictions, leading to open confrontation between the opposing forces. The politics of adjustment in Nigeria has received scholarly attention.[30] Its immediate impact was the deepening of the social and economic crisis. This took place within a political context marked by authoritarianism and the shrinking of political space to exclude all those opposed to the military wing of the power bloc. Thus the initially peaceful protests of the social movements of the Niger delta assumed more frequency as the harsh effects of adjustment sank deeper. The situation was worsened by the deregulation of the oil industry, which underscored the desperation of the state to get

more oil rents to service its huge external debt and resolve the economic crisis in which it was immersed.[31]

For global oil it was an equally desperate period, with the competing oil giants keen to build up their reserves and expand the process of capital accumulation which had been in the throes of recession since the oil-shocks of the 1980s. The deregulation of the oil industry in Nigeria gave the oil companies better leverage to expand investments. The consequence of the foregoing was the deepening of contradictions between the transnational coalition and the people of the oil communities. It was the balance of power between the feuding oil minorities factions *vis-à-vis* the transnational coalition and the coercive apparatus of the state that eventually defined the outcome of the struggle. Under structural adjustment, the state reinforced its political functions and remained central to the process of oil-based accumulation. The radicalisation of the Ogoni struggle, which had become evident in the demands listed in the 1990 Ogoni Bill of Rights, gave notice to the state that the struggle was directed against oil-based accumulation—the very basis of state power, dominant class hegemony, Shell and Nigeria's place in the global capitalist system.

Justifying Ogoni resistance, Ken Saro-Wiwa emphasised its moral advantage:

> Over the past thirty years, Ogoni has given Nigeria an estimated US thirty billion dollars and received NOTHING in return, except a blighted countryside, an atmosphere full of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons, a land in which wildlife is unknown, a land of polluted streams and creeks, of rivers without fish, a land which was in every sense of the term an ecological disaster.[32]

The formation of MOSOP in 1990, under the leadership of a broad coalition of the Ogoni faction of the oil minorities ruling class, took the struggle to a higher level. It was in the thick of this struggle that the cracks within the Ogoni widened, and the radical and more militant faction of MOSOP assumed ascendancy, to the desperation of the more conservative elements and their transnational allies. The basic issues on which the MOSOP-led resistance against Shell and the state were based included the following: the need for social justice for minorities, equity in power sharing in Nigeria, compensation for environmental devastation and the restoration of the environment, payment of economic rents to oil-producing areas, human dignity and self-actualisation.[33] There is no doubt that these considerations ran against the logic of the expansion of global capital and domestic accumulation in Nigeria. By 1993 MOSOP decided to apply more pressure. According to Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP had the 'moral advantage' and 'time and world opinion was on the side of the Ogoni struggle'.[34]

From 1991, MOSOP internationalised its struggle, taking its case to Amnesty International, Greenpeace, the Geneva-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), the London Rainforest Action Group and, eventually, the United Nations.[35] It waged its campaign through lecture tours, newspaper articles and documentary films showing the atrocities being committed against the Ogoni by Shell and the state in Nigeria. In this way the

dimensions of the ecological disaster and denial of rights which the Ogoni suffered from Shell and the state were used to shock the global community into putting pressure on the 'unequal partnership' to respect the rights of the Ogoni to self-determination.

The Ogoni strategy of internationalising its struggle was partly based on its reading of certain developments at the global level: 'the end of the cold war, increasing attention being paid to the global environment, and the insistence of the European Community that minority rights be respected in the USSR successor states and in Yugoslavia'.[36] By 1993, MOSOP had been transformed by the dialectics of the struggle into a popular social movement. The conservative leadership was pushed aside by the more militant cadres in the National Youth Council for the Survival of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and the Federation of Ogoni Women's Associations (FOWA). NYCOP and FOWA were able to mobilise the Ogoni masses under the leadership of MOSOP. As tensions rose, they became more militant. The final split in MOSOP took place when the conservative faction lost a crucial vote to prevent the Ogoni from boycotting the June 1993 Presidential elections. The radicals, who had demonstrated their strength earlier in the year when they successfully organised a huge peaceful rally marking Ogoni day, purged the leadership of MOSOP of the conservatives, and voted in Ken Saro-Wiwa as their leader. Under his leadership, the radicalisation of the social movement grew quickly and before long the people were able to block access to oil wells in Ogoni, forcing Shell to stop operations and costing the Shell–state partnership an estimated daily loss of N9.9 million from May 1993.[37] Equally significant was that some oil communities following the MOSOP example drew up 'charters of demands' and raised pressure on Shell and the state.[38] The developments of 1993 and 1994 clearly convinced the transnational alliance that the danger they faced was the possible subversion of oil-based accumulation in Nigeria. To the dominant domestic class the revolutionary activities of MOSOP were a direct threat to its hegemony, as well as to the legitimacy of the oil minorities faction aligned to the dominant class.

Neither Shell nor the state acceded to the demands of MOSOP. Shell's strategy was to deny responsibility, insisting that MOSOP was making unreasonable demands, sabotaging oil installations and exaggerating the extent of ecological damage in Ogoni.[39] The state viewed MOSOP activities as subversion and economic sabotage. Consequently, the struggle became militarised, with the state and Shell mobilising armed troops to force through the continued global project of controlling the Ogoni environment. These troops occupied Ogoni villages and unleashed a reign of terror against suspected MOSOP cadres and the peasantry who sympathised with the MOSOP cause. Entire villages were sacked, people lost their lives, and many took to hiding in the bush. Nothing was spared in crushing the MOSOP revolution. At the same time, the conflict between the radicals and the conservatives raged within the Ogoni elite. The conservatives, backed by global and statist forces, became the target of MOSOP militant cadres, and were increasingly despised by the social and political forces ranged against the transnational coalition. It was during one such incident that four leading members of the Ogoni political class suspected of being 'counter-revolutionaries' were murdered by a mob in Ogoni land. The might of global and state

capital moved in, and in November 1995 nine leaders of MOSOP, including Ken Saro-Wiwa, were hanged on the orders of a special tribunal after being convicted on counts of inciting a mob to murder the four Ogoni chiefs.

Since the conviction and hangings, the Ogoni struggle has been in retreat locally, while the international campaign is being sustained by Ogoni activists in exile.[40] The international campaign seeks to mobilise support for the imposition of sanctions on the state in Nigeria and for 'calling Shell to order',[41] and seeks the release of 19 MOSOP activists currently awaiting trial for the murder of the four chiefs.[42]

Outcomes and lessons

It is rather difficult to predict what the eventual outcome of local Ogoni resistance against Shell expropriation will be. However, at the present conjuncture it has spelt tragedy for local resistance. Currently, the balance of forces is in favour of the transnational coalition. What is tenuous and unclear, however, is the situation at the domestic level, where the power bloc is facing a crisis of governance. It would seem that, given the 'political' contradictions within the dominant class and the rejection of neoliberalism (economic and political) by its domestic hegemonic component, there lies a hotly contested space which could spark off an intra-class war. Such an outcome would invariably serve notice to the forces of local resistance to take advantage. Yet the possibility of this happening is now rather remote.

The lesson of the reversal of the Ogoni revolution is the danger in underestimating the capacity of global capital and the state to defend oil-based accumulation in Nigeria. The opinion is expressed that the Ogoni revolution failed partly because it took place ahead of its time, and because MOSOP did not work hard enough to build solid tactics and alliances. Indeed, the revolution hardly spread beyond Ogoni land. Without strong linkages to neighbouring oil communities or movements outside the Niger delta, it was easy for Shell and the state to isolate the Ogoni locally and stifle their revolution. Equally important is the overestimation of the pressure that global civil society could bring to bear on Shell and the state in Nigeria, and ignorance of the extent to which organisations such as Amnesty, Greenpeace and UNPO could go in actually stopping the ecological devastation of Ogoni, and the limitations they faced if they attempted to block Shell and the vital interests of the G-7 countries. It is not clear, finally, if MOSOP had an advanced ideological clarity about the ramifications of its struggle. A lot rested on the moral advantage and the justness of its cause. Anger, bitterness and personality differences played a major role in sowing discord in the ranks of Ogoni leadership. The infiltration of the movement by 'counter-revolutionary forces' of the transnational coalition paved the way for its subversion from within.

In sum, the remnants of MOSOP's cadres in Ogoni are still carrying on the struggle, but it is clear that they are in retreat. The lesson of the Ogoni tragedy for other social movements seeking to make a revolution at the dusk of the 20th century is that the task is very difficult and requires rigorous preparation, based

on the correct reading of the balance of social and political forces and their position in the globalised empire of capital.

Notes

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16. The three dominant ethnic groups in Nigeria are the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibo and the Yoruba.
17. Odoliyi Lolomari, 'The evolution of Nigeria's oil policy', in: *Edited Proceedings of the 1976 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society* (Nigerian Economic Society, 1976), p. 14.
18. Ludwig Shatzl, *Petroleum in Nigeria* (Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 24–6.
19. The oil companies included Mobil, Gulf (now Chevron), Agip, Satrap (now Elf), Tenneco and Amoseas (Texaco/Chevron).
20. Cyril Obi & Kayode Soremekun, 'Oil and the Nigerian state: an overview', in: Kayode Soremekun (Ed.), *Perspectives on the Nigeria Oil Industry* (Amkra, 1995).
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