Topic 13: Future of Africa?

Water, drought and the environment in Africa

The economies of most countries in Africa depend on agriculture, while at the same time the countries are plagued by drought or diseases such as trypanosomiasis, which is transmitted by the tsetse fly. African agriculture cannot be considered archaic, as European colonialists believed. African farmers have usually responded to long periods of land regeneration by shifting cultivation, and have likewise adapted to the influx of new crops. After all, maize and cassava, probably the two most widely grown crops, originated in the Americas, as did other cash crops such as tobacco, beans, etc.  Drought is one of the biggest problems in many African countries. Ethiopia or Somalia struggle with droughts every year, affecting mainly lowland areas.  In addition, in 2020, countries in the Horn of Africa were also affected by waves of locusts that decimated crops. However, in addition to the Horn of Africa, countries in Africa's south are sometimes affected, such as Zimbabwe in 2016. While the latter is one of the countries with a rather controversial international reputation due to the long-standing rule of the now-deceased Robert Mugabe, it has also long been an agricultural power in Africa. In 2000, President Mugabe came up with a land reform to give land to war veterans and other black people in the country, as most of the fertile land was farmed by the white minority. Not only did thousands of white farmers leave the country, but Zimbabwe came under fire for criticism, particularly from the UK. For a number of years the country faced partial international isolation and, above all, economic problems. Zimbabwe was notorious, among other things, for its enormous inflation, which reached dizzying heights.

In 2016, Africa was hit by a phenomenon called El Niño, so that between January and May, when it is usually relatively dry in Ethiopia, for example, it rained almost every day, while countries such as Zimbabwe, South Africa and Malawi struggled with unusual droughts. El Niño left behind thousands of dead domestic animals, dried up water supplies and devastated crops. Yet for most African economies, as we have said, agriculture is the cornerstone of the economy. Zimbabwe, the breadbasket of Africa, has had to import much of its food from neighbouring countries in recent years because of drought and economic difficulties. This is one of the reasons why, in the same year, President Mugabe was forced to declare a state of catastrophe, as around a quarter of the population did not have sufficient food supplies. At the same time, however, he blamed this state of affairs not only on low harvest yields, but also on the West and its sanctions imposed on the country for trampling on human rights.

On the other hand, the president's critics see the legacy of the aforementioned land reform as the reason behind the current situation, as many of the farms were underutilised, leading the government to reassess the situation and push for greater utilisation of farmland. Although the government is thus trying to declare its desire to prevent further loss of life, given the lack of resources and international isolation, this task is likely to be difficult. Already the 2015 harvest was, according to some sources, 50% lower than the previous year. In some areas of Zimbabwe, such as Manicaland province, most of the cattle there have died and only the more resilient animals, such as goats, have survived.  However, El Niño is also at work in other parts of Africa. For example, some parts of Ethiopia are suffering from drought and the risk of famine, while others are experiencing very long rainy seasons, even in May, which is supposed to be by far the driest and hottest time of the year. This shows how vulnerable countries that depend on agricultural production are to such crises, whether caused by political or environmental problems and fluctuations.

Indeed, in the past, particularly in the 1980s, it was often a combination of natural disasters and political setbacks. Between 1983 and 1985, for example, there were major famines in Ethiopia and Sudan. But both countries were going through civil war. In Sudan, the black and mostly Christian south fought against the Arabized and Muslim north. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, a number of liberation fronts were fighting against a Marxist military dictatorship. When a terrible drought struck both countries, millions of people found themselves in acute danger. The government then not only failed to inform the people of the ongoing famine, but also prevented the supply of food to the regions that were fighting against the government. Yet food was relatively plentiful in other parts of the country and many lives were saved in 1985 thanks to foreign aid. 

This brings us to the issue of water, closely related to the drought. As the population grows, water is becoming an increasingly scarce commodity, which can be reflected, among other things, in the emergence of conflicts or outbreaks of tension in different parts of the world. The control of water resources has always been part of the tactics of every war, conflict or clash. For example, when the European powers partitioned Africa during the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the main interest of the powers was to allow free trade on the Niger and Congo rivers. Great Britain was equally keen to control the entire Nile basin, which it did in the colonial era. Water resources are not only used for fishing or basic daily subsistence, but are also important communication and strategic points. Very often, rivers form borders between states and control of the water flow was then very important to defend against any external threat. Water resources are, for example, an important part of international law, as some lakes (such as Lake Chad) form borders between several states and the interests and claims of several governments clash.

The economies of some countries are entirely dependent on watercourses, perhaps the most classic example being the Nile, which is the economic artery for a number of countries from the Great Lakes region to Egypt. It is Egypt that has long acted as a power with an exclusive say in the use of the Nile basin. This was the case until the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak, since when Egypt has been somewhat weakened on the international stage, as reflected, for example, in Ethiopia's growing ambitions to become a major power in the export of electricity, which is linked to the issue of building a network of hydroelectric power stations.

As a country rich in water resources, Ethiopia has already set itself the goal of becoming a hydroelectric power in Africa under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1991-2012). This will not be without problems both internationally and in the affected areas, as both the GERD dam just constructed and some smaller projects like the Gilgel hydroelectric projects on the Omo River are causing the displacement of about two hundred thousand people, mainly in the Omo Valley.

The Nile Basin includes eleven countries: Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. However, it has always been Egypt that has dominated all the events surrounding the Nile, as the Nile is a vital economic artery for Egypt and has therefore to some extent monopolised the use of the river. It was Ethiopia and Egypt that concluded an agreement in 1993 regarding their relationship with the Nile, which states, among other things, that each party shall refrain from any activity in relation to the Nile that could cause appreciable harm to the other party. Until recently, Ethiopia had not made any specific demands regarding the Nile, partly because it was just emerging from years of fighting against a dictatorial regime in the 1990s and partly because Egypt was at the height of its power at the time. It therefore made no sense to question Egypt's claims to the Nile. More recently, however, there has been a significant reversal in this relationship, with Ethiopia declaring its plan to build the Great Renaissance Dam in 2011, at the same time that Mubarak's government in Egypt was swept away by the so-called Arab Spring, which greatly weakened Egypt's bargaining position and existing hegemony on the Nile. The year 2011 brought about major changes, as in addition to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Sudan was split into two independent states, South Sudan and Sudan, thus diluting Sudan's position, and in turn providing the Ethiopian government with the opportunity to take advantage of a kind of power 'vacuum' on the Nile to present and, above all, implement ambitious projects. Egypt's diminishing role seems to be one of the main factors behind Ethiopia's intensified efforts to make effective use of the Nile. A few years ago, such plans would have been unthinkable, as the case of Tanzania in 2004 suggests. At that time, the Tanzanian government decided to introduce a project to irrigate land from Lake Victoria, which was strongly rejected by the Egyptian president, who even threatened Tanzania with the use of force. Ethiopia's growing economic stability and relative prestige, challenging Egypt's long-standing dominance, intensified negotiations with the smaller Nile states.  

The construction of a gigantic hydroelectric power plant on the Nile has not only an international political dimension, but also a socio-economic one, as the roughly five hundred million dollar construction may be threatened by exorbitant estimates in electricity production in the future. According to government sources, thousands of civil servants have responded enthusiastically to the plan to build the Nile project and have donated one month's salary for its construction.

The issue of national energy security is also an important factor that the Ethiopian government hopes to use to quell resistance and boost national pride. When celebrations were held for the twentieth anniversary of the fall of the Dergo on 28 May 2011, the government took the opportunity to hold a referendum on the construction of the largest hydroelectric power plant in the Horn of Africa. In doing so, the government wanted to demonstrate to the world the political unity and support emanating from the 'ordinary' people, but they were often coerced into attending the meeting by party cadres. The construction of this monumental project also has a political dimension, as regimes such as the Ethiopian one use similar works to promote the image of a great nation, government and national leader, such as Meles Zenawi in this case. Such projects play the role of a kind of monument to the regime. The common denominator of these projects is the lack (or even absence) of communication between the government and the public, especially in relation to those populations most affected by its construction. 

In recent years, as Ethiopia has become one of the 'lions of Africa' and strengthened its hegemony in the Horn of Africa, diplomatic tensions between Addis Ababa and Cairo have increased. While Egypt has focused its efforts on highlighting the negative aspects of the project, the Ethiopian side stresses that the hydroelectric plant will benefit everyone, including Egypt and Sudan. Egypt fears the loss of its current leadership position on the Nile, while Ethiopia seeks to confirm its role as a regional power through electricity exports, especially when it lacks its own resources such as oil, diamonds and gold. Under the current government of Egyptian President Sisi, the solution to the dispute between the two countries seems to lie in diplomatic negotiations rather than forceful solutions. The near future and the launch of a large hydroelectric power plant on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia will then show which direction the issue of watercourses and disputes over them will take in this part of the world. While Ethiopia has a number of watercourses and is one of Africa's major water reservoirs, Egypt cannot say this and therefore the Nile issue is vital to it. Concerns about the projected 15% drop in the Nile's flow after the opening of the GERD are therefore understandable.

Africa has 'traditionally' been one of the areas with the highest incidence of famine in the world, although the percentage of people living in conditions of absolute poverty and at risk of famine is decreasing according to some statistics. Agricultural production in Africa has been increasing over the last twenty years, but this has mostly been due to the expansion of agricultural land, a trend that has reached its limits. An important part of agricultural development is the so-called 'green revolution', which has brought more sophisticated farming systems, more resilient crops, irrigation and more efficient harvesting systems to all parts of the world, especially to countries dependent on agricultural production. Africa has certainly not been spared from this trend. Without the Green Revolution, the prices of some foods, such as rice, would be up to 40% higher.  The experience of the Green Revolution in Asia shows that rapid increases in productivity can be achieved in a relatively short time. However, the Green Revolution must be linked to a number of other aspects such as adequate public investment, rural support or the availability of modern financial markets and services for farmers and the development of agricultural technologies.

Foreign donors are also involved in the Green Revolution, and to a significant extent. For example, the Rockefeller Foundation is now helping the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and overseeing a new seed research programme it funds jointly with the Gates Foundation. However, the work of such foundations has its critics, who fear the dominance of the Gates Foundation, playing the role of a kind of god deciding the fate of the continent.  One of the countries that has seen significant growth in the agricultural sector is Ghana, one of the most stable countries in Africa and, after Côte d'Ivoire, the most important producer of cocoa. As the most important export commodity, cocoa has also traditionally received financial assistance from the government.

Digitisation and new technologies

Digitalisation is a global phenomenon affecting almost all sectors of the economy, and Africa is no different.  It is clear that digitalisation can contribute to reducing social inequalities if it is coupled with appropriate policy instruments to prevent the widening of already often significant social inequalities in a number of African countries. According to economists, Africa needs the help of African governments on the basis of the three C's (competition, capital, capacity) on the road to a successful digital transition. Through the competitive environment, there is pressure to create new and better technologies. Capital is not only financial capital, which is necessary for the development of digital technologies, but also human capital; the policy environment must enable the development of an entrepreneurial, often informal, sector that could benefit from digital technologies. Last but not least, governments in Africa need greater capacity in terms of improved tax collection, balanced budgets and social protection, which in many African countries is languishing precisely because of limited fiscal resources.

According to an African Union document entitled 'Africa's Digital Transformation', the goal is universal access to the internet, which would mean a 2% annual increase in GDP and a 1% annual reduction in poverty. So-called mobile money has a relatively long tradition in sub-Saharan Africa and there are countries that are setting trends in this direction.

Within Africa, the leader is Kenya, which has not only introduced the M-Pesa mobile currency, but is also setting trends in digitalisation in telecommunications, transport, electronics, and heavy industry. ICT (information and communication technology) has become part of the Kenyan government's Vision 2030. According to some figures, the M-Pesa has lifted up to 200,000 households out of poverty, and in particular enabled a significant number of women to emancipate themselves from subsistence agriculture towards business. In the agricultural sector, Kenyan farmers use a range of apps that make it easier for them to grow and harvest crops, but also to connect with buyers. All this means that agricultural productivity is increasing, contributing 26% of Kenya's GDP directly, and a further 27% indirectly in sectors that are directly linked to agriculture.   As part of Vision 2030, the Konza Technological City, also called Sillicon Savannah, was announced as the flagship for ICT technology or services based on the use of IT. This goes hand-in-hand with the Kenyan government's efforts to attract investment from abroad, in which Kenya has done a tremendous job in greatly simplifying investment and business opportunities in the country. 

In 2016, there were nearly 120 technology hubs across Africa, most often run by private companies, non-profit organisations, foundations or development consortia. In addition, there are academic, government-established, or hybrid technology centres involving government and non-government institutions or external donors such as the World Bank.  Equally important in innovation and digitalisation in Africa is Rwanda, which has made great strides since the 1994 genocide to become the 'Singapore of Africa' under the leadership of President Paul Kagame, sometimes called the 'Digital President', who organises 'Transform Africa' conferences in Kigali.  Although for a long time Rwanda was one of the countries dependent on foreign aid, President Kagame announced Vision 2020, which emphasised domestic manufacturing, ICT, tourism with the secondary goal of serving as the distribution and logistics hub of East Africa. In addition to agriculture, the service sector contributes 43.9% of Rwanda's GDP, while industry contributes another 18.7%, promising figures compared to many countries in, for example, the West African Sahel, speaking to the growing importance of the service sector.